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INTRODUCTION 
Drug trafficking organizations have held sway in Mexico since half a century ago. Violence by the 
drug cartels has been a major concern in political and social context ever since. In consequence, 
authorities have faced the necessity to counteract criminal organizations, yet the state has been 
lacking credible strategies for defeating the cartels.1 The first far-reaching strategy was introduced 
in 2006 when the newly elected President Calderón set the fight against the drug cartels as the main 
threat to national security and its administration’s primary focus. He launched a vigorous strategy 
to fight the criminal organizations, known as the war on drugs. The strategy involved deploying 
around 50,000 combatants to perform the tasks of law enforcement to bolster weak civilian police 
forces. 
 
Contrary to its goal of reducing violence, Mexico’s homicide rate has more than tripled since the 
onset of the war on drugs.2 The surging homicide rate and general feeling of insecurity have urged 
the authorities to rethink their approach on how to combat drug-trafficking. Extensive discussions 
have been taking place in the public fora in recent years on how to firmly strengthen the public 
security system.3 To this end, several reforms are under way which aim at supporting the progress 
for restoring public safety, including an overhaul of the criminal justice system which was 
introduced since it had that far been weak and unfit for effectively dealing with strong and resilient 
criminal organizations. The effective implementation of such reforms, however, is time-consuming 
and positive results are becoming visible only gradually. 
 
The core of Calderón’s strategy involved deploying the armed forces in the tasks of law 
enforcement to bolster weak civilian police forces. The expected auxiliary role of the armed forces, 
however, soon turned into effectively replacing the civilian police causing a full-fledged 
militarization of law enforcement. The approval process of this disputed strategy was opaque and 
the decision to use the armed forces lacked solid legal grounds.4 The war on drugs failed in its goal 
to swiftly destroy the cartels and, on the contrary, significantly intensified the confrontations 
                                               
1 J. Chabat. Combating Drugs in Mexico under Calderón: The Inevitable War. Centro de Investigación y Docencia 
Económicas. pp. 1-6. 
2 Between 2006–2018. Official data by Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics, Geography, and Information (INEGI) 
Accessible: http://en.www.inegi.org.mx/app/tabulados/pxweb/inicio.html?rxid=75ada3fe-1e52-41b3-bf27-
4cda26e957a7&db=Mortalidad&px=Mortalidad_08 
3 See, for example, M. Meyer, X. Suárez-Enríquez. By Strengthening Military’s Role in Fighting Crime, Mexico’s 
Proposed Security Law Will Worsen Human Right Abuses and Harm Transparency. Washington Office on Latin 
America, 2017. 
4 D. Wilkinson. Mexico: The Militarization of Public Security. Human Rights Watch. 05.09.2018.  
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between the cartels and public security forces. Another problematic consequence has been an 
upsurge in human rights violations against civilians committed by the members of the armed forces. 
 
Foreseeing a key role for the armed forces in the fight against criminal organizations has been 
controversial. As the capability of public security forces has been limited, well-equipped 
combatants could be a promising resource readily available to fill the void. The ever-increasing 
power of drug cartels has become an extraordinary obstacle for the functioning of the society. The 
government has been unable to exert sovereign authority in parts of its territory, losing control to 
the drug cartels. In these circumstances, the use of the armed forces as an exceptional and 
temporary measure for defeating drug cartels has seemed a promising policy option for Mexico’s 
administrations. Despite that, the use of the armed forces in civilian law enforcement could only 
be conceivable, if at all, when the scope of their action is limited by a strong legal framework. 
  
The thesis is written at a crucial moment for the subsequent development of public security 
challenges in Mexico. The new federal cabinet took office in December 2018. The change of power 
comes at a time when violence is spiking, and so security issues are high on the agenda. 
Consequently, reducing violence is among the top priorities for the new administration.5 While 
heavily criticizing the public security strategy of previous cabinet under President Peña Nieto 
during the election campaign6, the newly-elected President now has to come forward with his own 
strategy. The administration has revealed some of its initial plans, promoting the creation of a 
National Guard. Several elements of the new strategy, however, have received widespread 
criticism. Therefore, Mexico’s new administration needs to take well-informed decisions on how 
to proceed with public security strategy to prevent repeating similar mistakes as the preceding 
administrations. 
 
This thesis aims at providing legal input for the discussions over the future of the public security 
framework. The problem lies in the compatibility of the use of the armed forces in law enforcement 
with the system of protection of human rights. The objective of the thesis is to determine whether 
and to what extent can the use of the armed forces be legally integrated into the public security 
framework of Mexico to reinforce public security forces in the fight against drug-trafficking, taking 
into account legal obligations to uphold the system of protection of human rights. 
 
                                               
5 B. Russel. Five Priorities for AMLO’s Government. Americas Quarterly. 28.01.2019.  
6 D. Guzmán. AMLO Changes Course on Mexican Security After Record Bloodshed. Bloomberg. 09.08.2018.  
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Violence related to drug-trafficking has been a key concern in Mexican society and politics for 
decades. Hence, it has also earned significant attention from academia. While the focus has been 
on the social impact of drug-trafficking and militarization as well as on the violation of human 
rights, the legal considerations of the possible use of the armed forces have thus far attracted only 
limited attention in academia. The main legal question discussed in the academic literature pertains 
whether the situation in Mexico constitutes a non-international armed conflict. This thesis can be 
considered novel because the legal options for the use of the armed forces and the compatibility 
with the system of protection of human rights are considered against the background of the 
functioning of democratic governance. Moreover, through the examples of three representative 
case studies, the thesis gives a practical insight on the channels how the use of the armed forces 
may lead to human rights abuses. Understanding these channels is the key for designing a public 
security force that has necessary safeguards for the effective protection of human rights. 
 
The object of the thesis is the use of the armed forces in civil law enforcement. Necessary 
information is provided in the thesis to analyze the link between the use of the armed forces in law 
enforcement and the potentially harming effect on the system of protection of human rights from 
different angles. For instance, the importance of governance structures are emphasized and 
concrete examples of human rights abuses are given to understand whether legal safeguards could 
be sufficient for matching the resources of the armed forces with the tasks and expectations of civil 
law enforcement. The main research questions are concerned with the system of protection of 
human rights in connection with the use of the armed forces in law enforcement: 
• What are the legal options for the use of the armed forces and how to create legal safeguards 
to prevent human rights violations? 
• Is the criminal justice system of Mexico adequate to prevent harming the system of 
protection of human rights? 
• What are the main human rights violations committed by the armed forces and under which 
circumstances are civilians most vulnerable? 
The author puts forward a hypothesis that the use of the armed forces in civil law enforcement in 
Mexico would be compatible with the system of protection of human rights in the presence of 
adequate safeguards within the public security framework, given the specific circumstances 
regarding the state of democracy. If this hypothesis holds, the armed forces could be used to 
reinforce public security forces in the fight against drug cartels in Mexico. 
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The focus in this thesis is on the exceptional and temporary use of the armed forces that could be 
conceivable in extraordinary circumstances. The current situation in Mexico seems extraordinary 
as civilian police do not have enough resources to effectively fight against organized criminal 
organizations. Allocating proper resources to law enforcement could alleviate the public security 
threats, whereas finding and training the personnel is likely a time-consuming process making it a 
long-term option. Serious threats to public security, on the other hand, require prompt solutions. 
 
The thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter examines how effective different forms 
of governments are in safeguarding public security and protecting human rights. It is useful to 
clarify such interrelations to comprehend whether and how reinforcing democratic norms, practices 
and institutions impact the level of violence and the protection of human rights. The chapter then 
explores the state of democracy in Mexico which provides the basis for analyzing the legal options 
for the use of the armed forces within the public security framework. The chapter further discusses 
the role of the armed forces in the fight against the drug cartels, taking into considerations whether 
the situation in Mexico falls within the scope of a non-international armed conflict. 
 
The second chapter analyzes the possible legalization of the use of the armed forces in Mexico. 
The legal framework concerning public security poses serious troubles for the involvement of the 
armed forces in civil law enforcement. These threats derive to a large extent from debatable 
jurisdiction between the ordinary and military justice system when the members of the armed forces 
are involved in violating human rights of civilians. Solving these issues and improving the quality 
of ordinary justice system are a precondition for the use of the armed forces. The failure of the 
Internal Security Law which aimed at legalizing the use of the armed forces in law enforcement is 
then discussed. The chapter concludes with a legal analysis of the possibilities to legalize the use 
of the armed forces in civil law enforcement, reflecting on initial propositions by the new cabinet 
about the creation of a National Guard. 
 
The third chapter explores the actual militarization of public security in Mexico since 2006. Three 
cases are studied in depth in which the armed forces committed various human rights violations in 
their role within civil law enforcement. The cases demonstrate possible risks related to the use of 
the armed forces from the perspective of human rights protection. Understanding and considering 
these risks is essential for creating a new public security strategy that potentially involves the use 
of the armed forces as one of the elements. 
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The discussion and analysis of the first and second chapter rely to a large extent on peer-reviewed 
literature. The author uses international, regional and domestic human rights law and other national 
legal acts throughout the last two chapters for assessing the current legal framework and legal 
challenges of public security. The case law by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (the 
Court), other sources by the Organization of American States (OAS) and the National Human 
Rights Commission (CNDH) are primarily used for the analysis of human rights violations in 
chapter III. The author also makes use of the reports of different NGOs to examine the latest 
developments on the creation of legal framework for the use of the armed forces in the realm of 
public security. Analytical method is primarily used in the thesis. 
 
Keywords: security, armed forces, law enforcement, human rights, drug trafficking 
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CHAPTER I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEMOCRATIC 
GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC SECURITY 
 
1.1. Democracy, Public Security and the Protection of Human Rights 
 
This sub-chapter gives an insight on the complex link between the form of governance, security 
and human rights. Democracy enjoys a rather positive image because it is often associated with the 
core rights, such as freedom, liberty, equality, justice, basic rights and security.7 The link between 
democracy and public security, however, is not implicit. There is in fact no mechanism per se in 
democracy that would or should prevent threats to security or human rights more generally. 
 
Many authors have argued that democracy remains the most promising system of government for 
achieving peace and security. For instance, Albright et al.8 have stated that “years of empirical 
research demonstrate that strong democracies not only avoid war with one another, but also have 
much lower levels of civil conflict, deadly terrorism, attacks against women, violent crime, and 
poverty.” At the same time, experiences following the Arab Spring led some authors to conclude 
that the transition from autocracy to democracy is a major hurdle, which often generates chaos and 
can tip public security into collapse.9 It is, therefore, vital to explore what are the fundamental 
reasons that lead most researchers to believe that democracy should eventually lead to a more 
peaceful and secure society. 
 
Empirical studies have indicated that data on violence and its connection with democratic states 
might be misinterpreted as this relationship is not linear and so the interpretation cannot be 
straightforward. Several authors have found evidence that the hypothesis of the inverted U-shaped 
curve between violence and democracy holds.10 This theory suggests that the most vulnerable 
societies in terms of internal conflict and public security are those with hybrid regime of 
governance (or semi-democracies). At the same time, both strong autocracies as well as democratic 
                                               
7 R. J. Dalton, D. C. Shin, W. Jou. Understanding Democracy: Data from Unlikely Places. –18(4), Journal of 
Democracy, 2007, pp. 143-145. 
8 M. Albright, et al. Liberal Democracy and the Path to Peace and Security. Brookings and Institute for Security 
Studies, 2017, pp. 1-28. 
9 B. Aras, E. Yorulmazlar. Mideast Geopolitics: The Struggle for a New Order. –24(2), Middle East policy, 2017, pp. 
57-69. 
10 H. Hegre, T. Ellingsen, S. Gates, N. P. Gleditsch. Toward a democratic civil peace? Democracy, political change, 
and civil war, 1816–1992. –95(1), American Political Science Review, 2001, p.38, and J. D. Fearon, D. D. Laitin. 
Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. –97(1), American Political Science Review, 2003, p. 85. 
 10 
regimes with strong institutions and good governance demonstrate a much stronger ability to curb 
violence. 
 
A similar conclusion has been reached in human rights literature. In general, it is expected that 
turning the governmental system more democratic reduces the willingness and capacity of the 
state’s authority to violate human rights.11 More recent literature, however, has challenged this 
early hypothesis. A non-linear relationship between the level of democracy and state repression has 
been found instead12, similarly to the inverse-U relationship between democracy and violence. 
These results reveal that authorities in semi-democratic countries do not face sufficient control 
mechanisms that would deter them from repression. The likelihood of human rights violations will 
only start to decrease when democratic institutionalization establishes certain checks and 
balances.13 Fully-fledged autocracies, on the other hand, are characterized by a lack of political 
opposition which results in a more enduring political stability setting and also reduces the need for 
immediate repressions.14 Some latest research suggests that the relationship between the level of 
democracy and violations of human rights is even more elaborate than a non-linear inverted U-
shaped curve suggests. It is found that strong democracies indeed outperform autocracies in their 
ability to protect human rights.15 Empirical findings confirm the value of this framework for 
analyzing the interlinkages between democracy, security and human rights.  
 
While the divisions between the concepts of autocracy, democracy and the middle in between are 
relatively easy to grasp theoretically, it is much more difficult to apply these for practical purposes. 
The way autocracies and democracies are described and determined is often somewhat vague. In 
fact, all societies can be placed somewhere along authoritarian-democratic continuum. Each of the 
end points of this continuum is respectively the concept of pure democracy or pure autocracy 
which, however, is not found in actual cases.16 The societies very close to the end points can be 
classified as either democratic or autocratic. The societies that have both democratic as well as 
authoritarian characteristics are in the middle of the continuum and can be classified as semi-
                                               
11 R. A. Dahl. Political Oppositions in Western Democracies. Yale University Press, New Haven Connecticut, 1966. 
12 S. M. Mitchell, J. J. Ring, M. K. Spellman. Domestic legal traditions and states’ human rights practices. –50(2), 
Journal of Peace Research, 2013, p. 199. 
13 C. Davenport, D. A. Armstrong II. Democracy and the Violation of Human Rights: A Statistical Analysis from 1976 
to 1996. –48(3), American Journal of Political Science, 2004, p. 551. 
14 P. M. Regan, E. A. Henderson. Democracy, Threats and Political Repression in Developing Countries: Are 
Democracies Internally Less Violent? – 23(1), Third World Quarterly, 2002, p. 122. 
15 Z. M. Jones, Y, Lupu. Is There More Violence in the Middle?. –62(3), American Journal of Political Science, 2018, 
pp. 665-666. 
16 J. A. Cheibub, J. Gandhi, J. R. Vreeland. Democracy and dictatorship revisited. –143(1-2), Public choice, 2010, p. 
93. 
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democracies. In the context of this paper, it is especially important to comprehend which of the 
characteristics of each system make it resilient or vulnerable in terms of violence and protection of 
human rights. 
 
Strong autocracies are able to avoid violence mainly by monopolization of the state coercive power 
and authority. They are often associated with strict and rules-based society, repressive methods of 
law enforcement and general feeling of fear.17 This provides stability in the system due to the lack 
of opposition actively resisting the establishment. Even though the inverted U-shaped curve 
hypothesis suggests that autocracies perform well in terms of security, it is argued that over a longer 
term these systems tend to be more unstable than strong democracies. Schmitter and Karl18 have 
reflected on this, emphasizing that democracies are not immediately more efficient, orderly, stable 
or socially peaceful than other forms of government, yet democracies yield a better chance of 
sustainably attaining those universally acclaimed public goods. The inefficiency of autocracies 
derives from the increase of political awareness of the society over a longer term which is 
inexorable in a digitally connected world.19 It can be expected that if personal freedom will be 
limited over an extended period of time, the risk for a civil disorder intensifies. 
 
Strong democracies, on the other hand, have a capacity of containing violence for several reasons. 
To remain in power, governments need to seek for support in the public which provides incentives 
to voluntarily cede excessive power which may otherwise lead to the violations of human rights. 
Furthermore, full democracies have built-in structures that enable dissenting opinions to reach into 
decision-making as an input that is thoroughly reflected on.20 Strong systems encourage political 
participation by all groups of society, creating incentives to achieve their goals through peaceful 
means. As a result, involvement in political processes becomes a more efficient way for 
accomplishing desires of different societal groups than turning towards violent means. Apart from 
this, governments in strong democracies generally run diverse programs with a goal to reduce 
poverty and inequality. Some authors have suggested that in the long-run such policies also help to 
reduce violence as a side effect.21 
                                               
17 Davenport, Armstrong II, op. cit., p. 541. 
18 P. C. Schmitter, T. L. Karl. What democracy is... and is not. – 2(3), Journal of democracy, 1991, pp. 85-87. 
19 O. J. Reuter, D. Szakonyi. Online Social Media and Political Awareness in Authoritarian Regimes. –45(1), British 
Journal of Political Science, 2014, pp. 29-51, and A. T. Little. Communication technology and protest. –78(1) The 
Journal of Politics, 2016, pp. 152-166. 
20 Regan, Henderson, op. cit.,  pp. 120-121; 131-132. 
21 A. C. Poveda. Economic Development, Inequality and Poverty: An Analysis of Urban Violence in Colombia. –
39(4) Oxford Development Studies, 2011, p. 465. 
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Semi-democracies, contrarily, are more prone to the risks of violence. Usually these systems are 
characterized by a relatively strong commitment to honoring personal freedom, yet often there is a 
lack of actual involvement of different groups. This might be due to the unwillingness or 
incomprehension of political elites to actually pursue democratic principles or the lack of 
mechanisms to meaningfully channel social engagement into political decision-making 
processes.22 Inadequate credibility of the authorities in power tends to obscure the transparency 
and legitimacy of political process. This, in turn, increases the likelihood that the opposition secures 
enough support to topple the ruling government, generating further instability into the system. 
Moreover, semi-democracies are mostly associated with state incapacity and weak institutions, 
lacking the resources and capacity to effectively prevent and combat violence.23 A major root cause 
that further deteriorates the effectiveness of institutions is corruption which leads to exploiting 
much of the resources for personal instead of societal benefits.24 
 
The most important implication from the theory of inverted U-shaped curve between violence and 
democracy is that not every step towards a more democratic system necessarily feeds into better 
outcomes in terms of public security. From the perspective of security, it is paramount to implement 
strong and meaningful reforms in the democratization process. Empirical evidence suggests that 
only democratic societies with strong institutions and full adherence to democratic principles, such 
as the rule of law or protection of individual freedom, show intrinsically improved results in the 
fields of public security and human rights. 
 
To decrease the level of violence in weak democracies, it is of foremost importance to pursue 
necessary reforms for strengthening the institutional capacity and eventually the democratic 
culture, supporting truly inclusive democratic processes. Key prerequisites and avenues for 
improvement that semi-democratic states should undertake in order to move towards a more 
orderly public security apparatus have been identified:25 
(1) In the effort to calm mounting violence, governments themselves always need to honor the 
underlying norms of democracy and human rights. This embodies outright avoidance of abuses of 
human rights, such as extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, displacement of innocent 
civilians, arbitrary detention with little due process, cruel punishment or torture. This is imperative 
being the only way for these norms eventually becoming an inherent part of the society. Yet, local 
                                               
22 Davenport, Armstrong II, op. cit., p. 542. 
23 Fearon, Laitin, op. cit., pp. 75-90, and Davenport, Armstrong II, op. cit., p. 551-552. 
24 A. Graycar. Corruption: Classification and analysis. –34(2), Policy and Society, 2017, pp. 87-96. 
25 Albright, et al., op. cit., pp. 1-28. 
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circumstances should be taken into consideration while developing policies for fighting violence 
as far as the actions are not in conflict with fundamental democratic values. 
(2) States need to establish credible, inclusive and transparent channels for involving civil 
society. Holding free and fair elections regularly for legislative seats and other most important 
executive positions is a necessary but not sufficient requirement for effectively involving civil 
society. Political participation of all societal groups at all levels and at all times should be 
encouraged. 
(3) Strengthening public institutions is a key element in building up a strong democracy. 
Strong, accountable and transparent institutions help to keep up fundamental democratic principles, 
such as the rule of law, or address corruption with suitable anti-corruption tools. Moreover, auditing 
and oversight structures need to be developed in close association to strengthening institutions. For 
the institutions to function efficiently and be based on meritocratic principles, they need to be 
adequately funded.  
(4) States should strive for more gender-equal societies. Empirical evidence suggests that a 
more widespread involvement of women in political processes as well as in mechanisms for 
peaceful settlement of disputes paves a way to less conflict. 
(5) Adequate reforms based on best practices in the security sector must be carried out, 
including strengthening effective law enforcement and criminal justice systems that uphold due 
process. The use of force by the military must be subject to democratic control. Military personnel 
must receive ample training in order to naturally comply with international humanitarian (IHL) and 
human rights law (IHRL). Military personnel must also be held accountable to democratic and 
human rights principles. Last but not least, public security agencies must be properly resourced.  
 
Abundant crime is mainly characteristic to semi-democratic systems. One of the avenues for 
improving the state of public security would be the strengthening of democratic institutions. A 
possible setback, however, is that extensive violence may be detrimental to the development of 
strong institutions.26 To avoid this so-called violence trap, it is of utmost importance that semi-
democratic states tackle the criminal activities. If democratic norms, practices and institutions are 
not safeguarded in the fight against crime, the initial positive results may be short-lived as 
suggested by the inverted U-shaped curve. As regards human rights, the findings from literature 
evidently demonstrate that only states with a strong democratic system truly endorse human rights 
principles. 
                                               
26 G. W. Cox, D. C. North, B. Weingast. The Violence Trap: A Political-Economic Approach to the Problems of 
Development. Working Paper, California: Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 2015. 
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Mexico is known for high prevalence of crime, including domestic violence, organized crime and 
trafficking. High income inequality and poverty rates, a widespread feeling of impunity and the 
use of lethal violence by police are all contributing factors to high rates of crime. The current wave 
of violence is mostly attributed to the struggles of democratic consolidation and economic 
development as well as to the inability of improving social inclusion.27 More specifically, it has 
been suggested that much of the violence in Mexico can be linked to (1) social inequality, (2) level 
of poverty, (3) drug production and trafficking, and (4) general perception of impunity which is 
linked to the distrust of the judicial system and law enforcement.28 As a result, the majority of 
violence is delinquent and not political.29 Long-lasting violence suggests that Mexico has 
systematically failed to mitigate related concerns. 
 
While the interlinkages between democracy and public security are complex, the approach taken 
in this thesis, based on the empirical findings and the discussion above, follows the proposition 
that a well-established democracy delivers a more stable and secure society over the longer term. 
Furthermore, the underlying structure of democracy is the origin for solid protection of human 
rights.  
 
1.2. The Functioning and Robustness of Democracy in Mexico 
 
To further understand the role of democracy for public security in Mexico, this sub-chapter 
examines how robust its democratic system is. This will set up a basis for analyzing the implications 
of the proposed Mexican internal security law, National Guard and militarization in general on the 
security situation and the protection of human rights. The meaning of democracy is more 
ambiguous than it might seem at the first glance. To grasp what is the role of democracy in terms 
of peace and security, it is paramount to specify what is meant by the term. Even so, the purpose 
of this paper is not to define or thoroughly characterize democracy. The primary interest is on the 
specificities and functioning of democracy in Mexico. Hence, a brief overview of the term is given. 
It further serves to explain why the approach of democratic accountability is of interest in this 
thesis. Following the explanation of the approach, the focus will be turned to the relevant 
characteristics of democracy in Mexico. 
                                               
27 K. Koonings, D. Krujit. Societies of fear: The legacy of civil war, violence and terror in Latin America. Zed Books, 
1999, p. 3. 
28 J. Pearce. Perverse state formation and securitized democracy in Latin America. Journal Democratization. –17(2), 
2010, pp. 293-294. 
29 C. O. N. Moser, C. McIlwaine. Latin American Urban Violence as a Development Concern: Towards a Framework 
for Violence Reduction. –34(1), World development, Great Britain, 2006, p. 96. 
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Some references to Latin America are made throughout the analysis of the functioning of 
democracy in Mexico. Authors commonly take the view that the development of democracy in 
Mexico shares similar traits with transition processes in other Latin American countries.30 
Similarities in political and economic development derive from, inter alia, common colonial past, 
language and religion. It is for this reason that a comparison of some of the processes is deemed 
valuable. 
 
Liberal democracy has become the dominant political idea in modern world but it is worth 
highlighting that the term has evolved considerably over time. Scholars have been re-defining the 
term by adding or adapting the conditions and requirements that are needed for a full-fledged 
democracy. Various approaches to democracy have been defined as a result.31 Early attempts to 
define democracy can be concluded so that democracy is an arrangement where people gain a 
collective capacity for making decisions to achieve the common good.32 This definition can be seen 
as problematic as the centerpiece here is the common good which in itself is quite a vague term. 
The interests of individuals in a society usually diverge to a great extent and cannot be aggregated 
into a single variable. This is the reason Schumpeter33 has argued that for a democracy to work 
properly, political forces representing different parts of the society need to be competing with each 
other at elections. This definition helps to overcome the vagueness of the term public interest, 
suggesting that while ideas compete, the decisions are based on the will of the majority. 
 
Not all authors, however, have agreed with such minimalist way of defining democracy, indicating 
that free and fair elections in themselves do not guarantee a well-functioning democratic regime. 
On that account strong and functional institutions are also emphasized as essential pillars for a 
democratic society. These include rule of law, separation of powers or civil and political rights. 
Beetham34 points out that what makes democracy distinctive is favoring the legitimate rule and 
decision-making of the majority over collective decision-making while strong institutions are the 
key. This means that representative democracy has become the basis of democratic idea. While 
direct democracy may have desirable attributes, its actual functioning has proved to be inefficient 
                                               
30 P.H. Smith. Democracy in Latin America: Political Change in Comparative Perspective, Third Edition. Oxford and 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
31 See, for example, D. Collier, S. Levitsky. Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative 
Research. –49(3) World politics, Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 430-451. 
32 J. Ober. The Original Meaning of “Democracy”: Capacity to Do Things, not Majority Rule. –15(1), Constellations 
an International Journal of Critical and Democracy Theory, 2008, p. 7. 
33 J. A. Schumpeter. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York: Harper Perennial, 1976, p. 269. 
34 D. Beetham. Democracy and Human Rights. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999, p. 90. 
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which is why it is not the underlying meaning of democracy. Dahl’s35 seminal work points out 
criteria or individual rights that must be fulfilled in order to have a functioning representative 
democracy, emphasizing the role of people and competitive interest groups in holding the 
representatives accountable. 
 
More recently, there has been a growing emphasis on effective democracy, which means that 
democratic institutions need to be functioning efficiently also in practice. This means that the 
principles established by laws in terms of free and fair elections or other democratic principles have 
to function accordingly in reality. How effective is a democracy can be described by assessing to 
what extent the results of elections, or political input, actually determine the decisions that are 
made, i.e. political output. If political input translates into political output fairly well, democracy 
can be classified as effective which is the opposite of formal democracy.36 This indicates that it is 
crucial to analyze how the established democratic principles work to discern whether a seemingly 
democratic rule translates into democratic principles in practice. 
 
A simplified way to approach the question of how effective a democratic rule is would be to assess 
the functioning of the system against a set of principles. For instance, four main necessary 
conditions have been used to analyze the effectiveness of democracy in Latin America: (1) Regular 
occurrence of free and fair elections; (2) Nearly universal adult suffrage; (3) Protection of 
constitutional rights; (4) Negligible influence of the military and criminal organizations on the 
government. After performing an analysis by applying those conditions on Mexico, the authors 
come to the conclusion that it is a stable democracy with shortcomings.37 A similar conclusion can 
be drawn from various democracy indexes.38 While this is a valuable indication, it does not reveal 
whether those deficiencies fundamentally hinder the functioning of democracy. For the purpose of 
this thesis, it is essential to analyze to what extent certain democratic shortcomings may affect the 
performance and risks of the use of military forces for law enforcement. 
 
                                               
35 R. A. Dahl. Democracy and Its Critics. Yale University Press, New Haven Connecticut, 1989. 
36 R. Inglehart, C. Welzel. Political Culture and Democracy: Analyzing Cross-Level Linkages. Comparative Politics, 
New York, 2003, p. 66. 
37 S. Mainwaring, A. Pérez-Liñán. Cross-Currents in Latin America. –26(1), Journal of Democracy, 2015, p. 115. 
38 Most prominently Freedom in the World 2019 by Freedom House; Democracy Index 2018 by The Economist 
Intelligence Unit; and Governance Index in the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI). 
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Democracy can only function effectively in the presence of good governance. Yet, one of the most 
distinct characteristics of good governance is strong accountability.39 The more the public officials 
perceive the obligation to justify their conduct to the relevant institutions or the general public, the 
stronger the accountability mechanisms are.40 Leaders and officials on different levels of 
democratic governance must be held accountable for how they discharge their responsibilities to 
ensure good governance, and thus, accountability is sine qua non for democratic rule.41 If this is 
not the case, government’s processes remain opaque, which may lead to disregard of public goals 
and significantly impair and fracture a seemingly democratic rule. The reason for this is the nature 
of representative democracy where the power is gained in elections, making the representatives 
susceptible to corruption and misuse of power.42 The goal of holding representatives accountable 
is to force them to correct their behavior and justify their acts and omissions. Accountability 
mechanisms ensure that misbehavior and power abuse result in equivalent sanctions, formal or 
implicit, against the public officials.43 
 
While much of the research makes assumptions about institutional setups in which democracies 
either flourish or break down, the actual situation is more nuanced and regional differences must 
be accounted for being able to understand the state of democracy.44 For evaluating the effectiveness 
of democracy in Mexico, the focus here will be on how various accountability mechanisms support 
the functioning of democratic system. Accountability framework is pivotal for understanding 
democratic processes in any Latin American country because it sheds light on why and how the 
key principles endorsed by the states, such as the human rights framework, are respected in 
practice. A strong framework enhances the capacity of the state to implement the rule of law. 
Furthermore, in the context of this thesis, the accountability perspective also establishes a 
framework for analyzing whether the legalization of militarization of police forces could possibly 
be a successful way forward if meticulously designed safeguards are included in the law. When the 
state of democratic accountability is weak, these safeguards have little value in preventing human 
rights abuses and other unintended consequences resulting from militarization. Conversely, when 
                                               
39 S. Kosack, A. Fung. Does Transparency Improve Governance?. –17(1), Annual Review of Political Science, 2014, 
pp. 65-87. 
40 J. S. Lerner, P. E. Tetlock. Accounting for the Effects of Accountability. –125(2), Psychological bulletin, 1999, p. 
255. 
41 M. Bovens. Public Accountability. The Oxford Handbook of Public Management, Oxford, 2005, p. 192.  
42 C. T. Borowiak. Accountability and Democracy: The Pitfalls and Promise of Popular Control. Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2011, p. 16-17. 
43 M. Philp. Delimiting Democratic Accountability. –57(1) Political Studies, 2009, pp. 28-53. 
44 D. J. Yashar. Democracy, Indigenous Movements, and Postliberal Challenge in Latin America. –52(1) World 
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accountability framework is strong, these safeguards can be effective and temporary use of military 
forces for fighting serious criminal activity could be conceivable. 
 
Multiple conceptual approaches to accountability exist. For instance, authors have distinguished 
between principal-agent framework, internal and external or direct and indirect accountability.45 
For the purpose of this thesis, however, the dimensions of horizontal and vertical accountability 
accommodate the research problem the best. This approach also helps to identify the realms of 
democratic governance which must be reinforced to conceive the military resources undertaking 
some of the traditional police tasks in Mexico. An overview of horizontal and vertical 
accountability and the tools in the possession of different institutions is given in annex 1. 
 
Horizontal accountability refers to institutional and procedural limitations on power of the public 
officials and institutions. These concern the separation of powers, the system of checks and 
balances, or the due process.46 When those principles are firmly part of the democratic rule, they 
effectively limit the threat of power abuse.47 Vertical accountability, on the other hand, pertains to 
the instruments that the general public can deploy to raise social demands, control the government 
and hold the public officials accountable. The predominant element in here is the centerpiece of 
democratic rule – elections. The main downside of elections is that they only take place 
periodically.48 To compensate this, effective functioning of other elements of vertical 
accountability, such as civil society and media, is crucial.49 
 
It is evident that the effectiveness of accountability mechanisms is determined by both formal and 
informal procedures that have country-specific historical, institutional and cultural features. 
Strengthening both the horizontal and vertical accountability enables the emergence of more solid 
democratic systems. Because of the persistent nature of accountability arrangements, especially 
cultural values and institutional framework, improvements rarely take place swiftly.50 Measures 
that aim to improve accountability will have a gradual effect towards a more democratic system. 
 
                                               
45 R. Almquist, et al. Public Sector Governance and Accountability. –24(7-8) Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 
2013, p. 480. 
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Democratic regimes in Latin American countries have been discussed in the literature in numerous 
occasions. These studies provide a significant insight on Mexico. Profound differences and 
weaknesses can be pinpointed in the democratic system of Mexico compared to more advanced 
democracies. Several flaws related to traditional sources of accountability, such as formal elections 
or the system of check and balances, point to considerable institutional deficit. Many authors have 
concluded that if these inadequacies are sizeable, democratic rule is illiberal.51 It has also been 
argued that systems with serious horizontal and vertical accountability bottlenecks can fall into so-
called low accountability traps in which flaws in different accountability arrangement reinforce 
each other.52 Hence, improvements in horizontal accountability mechanisms might help to 
reinvigorate transition towards more dynamic vertical accountability practices. 
 
Multiple vocal civil society organizations have emerged in Mexico53, significantly strengthening 
the accountability of office holders. These movements have clearly had some success in the micro-
level but in general have not yet been able to decisively curb deep-rooted corruption and impunity.54 
These limitations notwithstanding, it has become increasingly critical to consider alternative 
sources of accountability in evaluating the robustness of the democratic system in Mexico. 
 
As regards horizontal accountability, the doctrine of separation of powers is the underlying 
principle of constitutional democracies that is designed to avoid excessive consolidation of power. 
As a result, it enhances the accountability of public officials.55 Typically, it limits the exercise of 
the core functions between executive, legislative and judicial branches, though contemporary 
democratic rules have additional layers of oversight bodies and other agencies to further underpin 
the limitation of power. The principle of separation of powers substantially limits the likelihood 
that one branch of the government assumes some of the fundamental functions of another branch, 
creating the primary source of accountability. As such, different bodies depend on each other in 
implementing policies.56 This implies, for instance, that even though legislative branch is 
responsible for creating laws, executive branch commonly has the task to draft the laws and judicial 
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branch interprets them. The principle of separation of powers was significantly reinforced in 
Mexico at the turn of the twenty-first century when constitutional structure was fundamentally 
ameliorated and the single-party democracy brought to an end.57 Subsequent to these changes the 
already existing constitutional principle of separation of powers took effect in practice. 
 
Horizontal accountability is not effective, however, in case of purely isolated powers and agencies 
but it is important to have counterbalancing interlinkages.58 Each branch of the government must 
have explicit instruments designed for checking and balancing other branches. These instruments 
can be developed under two conditions: (1) existing conflict of interest between at least two 
branches of government; (2) necessity to reach an agreement between two or more institutions with 
distinct powers.59 Hence, effective separation of powers is a prerequisite for a compelling system 
of checks and balances – a complex array of procedures which regulate the rights and obligations 
between the branches of government. The general purpose of those procedures is to overcome the 
risk that any of the branches would exceed its role or mandate. The checks and balances are 
sufficient only if each branch of the government has adequate powers to scrutinize the performance 
of other branches and take actions if needed.60 Above all, judicial review validates whether the 
actions by other branches are constitutional. If not, these actions are declared null and void. 
 
The reforms undertaken in Mexico over the past two decades have sought to improve the system 
of checks and balances, yet, the period of transformation is on-going, generating uncertainty and 
fragility.61 One of the foremost drawbacks has been the politicization of the judiciary, resulting in 
subservient and biased institutions.62 This is to some extent a result of frequent constitutional 
reforms aiming at bolstering the rule of law which at the same time have offered a pretext for 
reshuffling the courts.63 Constant overhaul of the judiciary may prevent the development of a strong 
and independent judicial system. Moreover, recent studies have found that populist governments 
with a strong electoral mandate can be detrimental to checks and balances by changing institutional 
order and, thus, weakening horizontal accountability.64 This may have a notable negative effect on 
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accountability in Mexico where the recent shift of power to President López Obrador has raised 
further questions on the soundness of the system of checks and balances.65  
 
Another indispensable layer of horizontal accountability is due process. This principle implies that 
all democratic institutions follow the laws and fundamental principles of the state. It guarantees 
equality before the law and that decision-making processes follow fair procedures. Mexico has 
experienced serious breaches in the due process in recent years, in particular in the field of criminal 
justice. The government has endorsed a strategy of fighting against organized crime no matter what 
actions are involved, including systematic use of repressive mechanisms like preventive detention 
and imprisonment.66 Such exceptional measures constitute a legal departure from human rights 
standards, and this greatly endangers the accountability framework, undermining the rule of law.  
 
The framework of horizontal accountability has certain shortfalls and uncertainties in Mexico as 
described above. The key constitutional principles are in place, but it does not necessarily hold 
relevant public authorities and officials accountable.67 The democratic system has improved since 
2000 when the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) lost its undivided authority over the country. 
This coupled with constitutional reforms has fundamentally strengthened the democratic processes. 
Nonetheless, it will take time for those processes to become fully embedded within the system. 
Until then, Mexican democracy remains somewhat weak and vertical accountability mechanisms 
are crucial to support its functioning. 
 
One of the sources of vertical accountability is a well-functioning electoral system. It has been 
argued that while free and fair elections are a necessary element of a democratic system, they are 
in fact a weak source of accountability.68 Through elections citizens award the power to the winning 
political force. While this decision is made based on political promises, it does not oblige the office 
holders to govern according to this vague mandate. If the electorate is discontented with the way 
of governing, the only formal chance to sanction the government is in the next elections. Another 
dimension weakening the role of elections even more is information asymmetry.69 The less 
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transparent a government’s rule is, the less information the voters have for evaluating its 
appropriateness, both its accomplishments and failures. 
 
Mexico has a multiparty system where electorate can make a choice between views from different 
parts of the political spectrum.70 This notwithstanding, often the winning candidate retreats starkly 
from campaign promises and mandate gained in elections.71 This raises questions over the 
legitimacy of the government’s rule and the adequacy of vertical accountability mechanisms 
between the elections. To mitigate obvious discrepancies, the informal link between the campaign 
promises and political decisions by the office holders needs to be reinforced. 
 
Accountability studies have not always included civil society as a major source of accountability. 
This has changed with the upsurge of civil society in advanced democracies. Non-governmental 
organizations tend to be less effective in otherwise poorly functioning democratic systems.72 
However, it has been noted that civil society can be instrumental in stabilizing, deepening and 
consolidating flawed democratic systems.73 The role of non-governmental organizations in 
controlling the government’s use of power is to monitor its acts and omissions. By increasing the 
transparency of government’s actions, civil society has an important function in agenda-setting.  
 
Civil society can effectively deter the power abuse through two main channels: (1) By exposing 
and criticizing government’s acts, it raises the public awareness and helps to put relevant issues on 
the public agenda. Shedding light upon previously opaque matters makes it difficult for public 
officials to negate the issues, increasing their responsibility for taking actions. (2) Elevated 
awareness can activate some of the instruments of horizontal accountability because it increases 
the possible reputational or judicial cost for public officials.74 Media supports civil society by 
sharing its findings and generating relevant information on its own. It plays a crucial role due to its 
ability to bring issues into the limelight.75 As a consequence, an effective civil society creates risks 
for public officials that the instances of misconduct will become public. This may deter officials 
from taking actions that are not in public interest. 
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The clout of civil society organizations is a key determinant that helps to understand the extent of 
accountability deficit. Civil society organizations are the most effective when they are autonomous 
from the state and their demand making process is institutionalized. Autonomous organizations are 
sufficiently independent from the state in both their actions and finances, so that they will not be 
biased and can openly challenge the government.76 Institutionalized demand making helps to 
ensure that the way of operation of civil society is rule-based and transparent.77 The classification 
of the relations between civil society and the state helps to assess the strength of civil society in 
holding the office holders accountable.78 Civil society in Mexico can be classified as bifurcated 
because the organizations are independent enough to challenge the state in the most crucial 
matters.79 At the same time, there is space for further institutionalization of civil society. 
 
As the analysis above suggests, Mexico suffers from both horizontal and vertical accountability 
deficit which weakens its democratic potential. Lack of trust towards democratic institutions is 
aggravated by impaired democratic participation of general population which undermines the 
functioning of the system.80 As such, Mexico can be classified as a semi-democracy. At the same 
time, sizeable improvements in both horizontal and vertical accountability need to be emphasized. 
Constitutional reforms and empowered civil society have been a crucial factor in it. While the 
progress has been substantial, several of the weaknesses remain proving how culturally dependent 
accountability and democratic mechanisms are. Democracy in Mexico has been going through a 
significant transformation which is still in progress. Hence, positive results expected from an 
efficient democratic system may not materialize immediately. On the contrary, several setbacks are 
to be anticipated. This makes it ever more important for Mexican authorities to proceed with the 
reforms as suggested above.81 
 
Mexico is facing an unprecedented wave of violence which needs to be tackled. When violence is 
rooted in the social order, death tolls are rising and insecurity soaring, it is understandable that 
some sort of urgent solution is expected from the authorities. The most obvious solutions, such as 
strengthening the police force and implementing poverty-reduction programs, however, are 
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complicated to implement and only have meaningful results over a longer term. Against this 
background, demand for firm security responses has increased. If, on the other hand, human rights 
abuses become embedded in security forces, it rather reproduces and transmits violent acts into the 
wider society.82 These interlinkages are one of the reasons why violence is still so prevalent in 
Mexico. To change the course, the Mexican government has to shape policies that genuinely have 
the ultimate goals of preventing and reducing violence. 
 
1.3 The Role of the Armed Forces in Public Security 
 
The scope of the use of the armed forces for maintaining public security depends on the specificities 
of each particular situation. The approaches to contemporary armed violence are complex and 
oftentimes the classification of the situation is not easy. The boundaries between war, internal 
disturbances and tensions or sporadic acts of violence are considerably ambiguous. On that 
account, the international community has been cautious when classifying a situation as an 
international or non-international armed conflict (NIAC).83 The main reason for such caution is 
different paradigms that apply based on the classification. In case of an armed conflict, the conduct 
of hostilities paradigm applies which is governed by IHL; on the other hand, the use of force by 
law enforcement officials is regulated by the law enforcement paradigm governed by IHRL.84 
 
Generally, the armed forces are trained according to IHL rules. The rules and principles regarding 
the use of force by the armed forces are drafted in the 1907 Hague Regulations85, the Additional 
Protocols to the Geneva Conventions86 and derive from customary IHL. When it comes to 
regulating the use of force, the conduct of hostilities paradigm has more permissive standards than 
the law enforcement paradigm. For example, under IHL the combatants are allowed to use lethal 
force when killing legitimate targets as long as they observe the basic rules (the principles of 
proportionality, distinction, necessity and precaution).87 This follows the logic that the ultimate 
object of the armed forces while conducting military operations is to defeat the enemy forces with 
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the use of lethal force. Consequently, incidental loss of life, or collateral damage, is tolerated more 
because it is inevitable in many cases.88 
 
On the other hand, police officers and security forces are trained in using force according to the 
law enforcement paradigm.89 The use of force in the law enforcement paradigm is primarily based 
on the right to life that derives from customary international law and human rights treaties as well 
as national law.90 Under IHRL, police forces are allowed to use force when performing law and 
order tasks to maintain or restore public security.91 Law enforcement officials, however, are 
forbidden to use lethal force as first instance. Lethal force may only be used for the protection of 
life if other measures at the disposal of officials are unlikely to yield an intended result. 
Accordingly, if police force recourse to the use of lethal force, an obligation to investigate every 
accusation of violation of the right to life emerges under the law enforcement paradigm to 
determine if the use of force was arbitrary or not.92 This obligation to investigate does not apply 
under IHL. 
 
Classifying the drug-related armed violence in Mexico has been a complicated legal question, and 
it is still disputed. The criteria defined in international law is open to different interpretations and, 
hence, it is often disputed whether a conflict should be governed by law enforcement paradigm or 
conduct of hostilities paradigm. In some circumstances military operations are being held in places 
where the enemies can mingle together with civilians. Being able to distinguish between civilians 
and the enemy may prove difficult to determine. Consequently, the applicable paradigm can 
become unclear.93 However, applying the proper paradigm is crucial because it constitutes the legal 
basis on how lethal force can be used.94 
 
If the armed violence in Mexico is classified as a NIAC, the role of armed forces in public security 
matters would become clearer. In a contemporary NIAC, combatants are entrusted with not only 
conducting military operations against the enemy but also with performing law enforcement 
operations to maintain public security and order.95 By applying the conduct of hostilities paradigm, 
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the tasks of the armed forces would be under a legal framework governed by IHL in which the use 
of force would be more in accordance with the training of the combatants. However, police forces 
would have to remain under the rules of law enforcement paradigm. 
 
It can be argued that the state has practically accepted the conduct of hostilities paradigm by using 
the armed forces in a way it has been done since 2006. Moreover, the language used by the 
authorities, most importantly referring to incidental loss of life as collateral damage, rather 
indicates that, de facto, the authorities approach to the conflict as a NIAC. If de jure approach is 
different, as the state has declared it is, the use of armed forces for performing public security tasks 
is questionable. 
 
On the other hand, if the armed violence in Mexico would be classified under the law enforcement 
paradigm, the rules on the use of force that have been used so far would need to change. The armed 
forces that are performing public security tasks would have to adjust to the different conditions 
regulated under IHRL. The rules on the use of force by the armed forces would have to be the same 
as the ones of the police officers. The use of force by the armed forces would only be allowed in 
order to maintain public security and law and order. The use of lethal force would only be permitted 
as a measure of last resort in order to protect life. 
 
The conflict in Mexico has so far not been interpreted as a NIAC by the government. Nonetheless, 
the authorities have realized that the law enforcement paradigm is not sufficient to fight powerful 
criminal organizations because of its restrictions on the use of force. While it would be 
inappropriate to apply IHL in all instances of drug-related violence, the intensity of the conflict in 
Mexico falls outside the ambit of typical organized crime. The lack of clarity over which paradigm 
applies in the conflict in Mexico has led to an overlap between the roles of civilian law enforcement 
and armed forces. This, as a consequence, has obscured the principle of separation of powers that 
is required for a well-functioning democratic country. 
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CHAPTER II. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE USE OF THE 
ARMED FORCES 
 
2.1. Legal Framework for the Safeguarding of Public Security 
 
2.1.1. The Effectiveness of the Criminal Justice System 
 
The underlying cause of the mounting violence in Mexico is not only drug-trafficking but much of 
the problems are generated by flaws in democratic governance, as discussed in chapter I. 
Dysfunctional judicial system is a key element in institutional setup of Mexico’s democracy that is 
dragging down the development of the country. Law enforcement and judicial structures are unable 
to effectively prevent, investigate, or punish crime and violence.96 Even if the drug cartels were 
destroyed with the help of the armed forces, this would not necessarily solve the problems with 
crime as other forms of criminal groups could emerge. To reduce violence over longer term, more 
structural issues need to be solved, including addressing shortcomings in judicial system.97 If this 
was done properly, it would, inter alia, make creating a temporary framework for the use of armed 
forces in law enforcement more feasible. Namely, it would facilitate bringing the members of the 
armed forces to justice. 
 
The fundamental structure of Mexico’s legal system is based on the principle of supremacy of the 
national Constitution. It is also based on the principle of separation of powers, restricting one 
another’s power though effective controls so the power would not concentrate within one entity or 
individual. In 2008, a Constitutional reform was approved in Mexico to initiate a process of 
transition from a mixed inquisitorial criminal justice system to an adversarial accusatory system. 
The reform established an eight-year term expiring in 2016 to fully switch to the new system.98 
 
In the mixed inquisitorial justice system, there was no division of functions and no balance of 
power as investigation, prosecution and judgment were generally concentrated within the same 
organ. Thus, one of the main differences in the new accusatory system included the reconsideration 
of the limits and control of the judicial power that previously existed in the mixed inquisitorial 
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justice system.99 This transformation of the criminal justice system has been one of the most 
important acts of progression in the legal framework in Mexico, offering measures for seeking 
justice in a more efficient and satisfactory way.100   
 
The reform of the criminal justice system intended to achieve a justice system that is proper for a 
state honoring the rule of law. The accusatorial system sets a clear division of functions between 
those who investigate, indict, defend and judge. It focuses on guaranteeing and protecting to a 
greater extent the fundamental rights and safeguarding the integrity of both, the victims and the 
defendants, throughout the proceedings. It also places a strong emphasis on the interests of the 
society as a whole.101 The new system vowed more transparency, accountability and procedural 
equality between the parties.102 For example, the presumption of innocence of the accused was not 
taken into consideration in the previous justice system, whereas the new system considers this legal 
principle as a vital one.103 In connection with this principle, Article 19 of the Constitution 
contemplates that pre-trial imprisonment must be the last alternative as a precautionary measure 
and, therefore, exceptional and well justified.104 
 
The new accusatory system introduced several guiding principles that regulate all the stages of the 
proceeding. Among the principles are: orality, immediacy, publicity, equality between the parties, 
impartiality, concentration, continuity and contradiction. These principles are enshrined in Article 
20 of the Constitution and in the legal doctrine.105 
 
In fact, orality or the use of oral procedures is not considered as a principle per se but as an element 
that facilitates and advances the development of the investigation. For example, the orality of the 
proceeding is closely related to the principle of immediacy. The main function of this principle 
concerns the regulation of the hearing of evidence in an oral and uninterrupted manner in the 
presence of all the parties concerned.106 The principle of publicity or open court principle requires 
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the proceedings to be open and accessible to the public and the media. The aim is to further 
transparency and to better involve the society in the functioning of the criminal justice system.107  
 
Moreover, the principle of equality between the parties or equality of arms aims to guarantee the 
rights contemplated in the Constitution and treaties. These rights include that all the parties of the 
proceeding, including the victim, the accused, the prosecutor and the public defender, have the 
same opportunities to present evidence and at the same time all parties are able to dispute it and 
challenge it during the oral proceeding.108  
 
On the other hand, the well-known principle of impartiality establishes that the final judgments 
should be founded on objective criteria. For example, the new accusatory system contemplates the 
participation of different judges throughout different phases of the case. For instance, the judge in 
charge of the oral proceeding shall not have prior information of the case that might prejudice or 
bias its opinion.109 The implementation of this principle is crucial to achieve a division of functions 
and balance of power within the system.  
 
Moreover, the principle of concentration allows the maximum number of acts to be carried out in 
the least number of hearings. Procedural celerity in the new justice system is essential in order to 
provide justice in a prompt and expedite manner. Furthermore, the aim of the principle of continuity 
is to ensure that the hearings develop in a continuous manner without interruptions. Also, it aims 
to reduce the time-gaps in between the hearings in order to shorten the trial.110 These two principles 
are strongly connected since both seek procedural efficiency. Lastly, the principle of contradiction, 
also called adversarial principle, is one of the most important elements of the new justice system. 
This principle allows each party to represent their interests and manifest their standpoint but also 
gives them the opportunity to contradict the claims and evidence of the opponent during the oral 
trial.111 
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Besides the principles introduced as a result of the constitutional reform, it is also important to 
mention that the criminal justice system is comprised of five institutions: the police, the 
prosecutors, the public defenders, the judges and the social reintegration centers. The new justice 
system provides these institutions with new functions and responsibilities. The thesis will cover 
the first four of these institutions because social reintegration centers fall outside the ambit of this 
thesis. 
 
In this vein, the accusatory system intends to strengthen the investigative powers of police by 
granting them with greater autonomy.112 The investigative powers of police include the 
responsibility of preserving the crime scene in order to obtain and protect the evidence and other 
means of proof. Also, they have the duty to conduct interviews and to retain data provided by the 
victims and witnesses.113 In order to have better outcomes in the investigations, police need to 
coordinate and combine efforts together with the prosecutor and the experts (such as forensic 
experts). 
 
Moreover, the prosecutor, has the burden of proof, which means that they must investigate the 
alleged facts that constituted the crime. As mentioned before, the prosecutor has to collaborate with 
the police and the experts to obtain necessary evidence that will be part of its investigation and 
analysis which will be concluded in the theory of the case that will be presented to the judge.114  
 
The role of the public defender is to develop its theory of the case in a judicious and clever way so 
that it is possible to refute the opposite’s claims.115 The defense can be represented either by a 
public defender or by a private attorney. 
 
Lastly, the role of the judges thoroughly changed as they are required to be more involved with the 
parties and be present in most of the hearings. The accusatory system established the creation of 
two different figures, the control judge (juez de control) and the enforcement judge (juez de 
ejecución de sentencias). Most importantly, the control judge intervenes from the initiation of the 
investigation until the commencement of the oral trial. This judge is primarily responsible for 
ensuring that the rights of the victims, accused or witnesses are protected. Another very important 
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function is to verify the legality of the detention of the accused as well as the legality of the actions 
of every official that takes part of the proceeding until the oral trial.116 When requested by the 
prosecutor, the judge can also issue precautionary measures as means of protection if it considers 
that the safety of the victim is in serious peril.117 Precautionary measures can also be issued to be 
certain of the presence of the accused in the proceedings.118 Moreover, the control judge can also 
approve agreements in the alternative resolution methods. The new system contemplates mediation 
or conciliation so the dispute can be solved promptly before the oral trial when it concerns a minor 
crime.119 The judge may supervise the conciliatory agreements reached by the parties through 
alternative resolution methods. Additionally, the control judge is competent to issue judgments in 
the abbreviated procedure. The abbreviated procedure is settled through the process of plea 
bargaining.120   
 
It can be concluded that the creation of the figure of the control judge is one of the most important 
developments in the criminal justice system. The primary function of the control judge is not to 
conduct the investigation, but to oversight the performance of the prosecutor to guarantee the 
complete observance and protection of the rights of the parties. This role contributes to a more 
transparent, efficient and protective justice system. 
 
The transformation of Mexico’s criminal justice system brings significant changes to improve 
investigations. Among the positive outcomes of the new accusatorial system is the fact that it 
requires the judges to be highly qualified. Besides, the procedures have become more efficient and 
effective since the principle of orality eases the workload of judges. Also, orality in the procedures 
has also helped to decrease the perception of corruption. The proceedings have become more 
transparent as all of the evidence is presented before the judge and only that evidence is taken into 
account for the final verdict. 
 
Some of the main features of the accusatory system are the guiding principles which grant the 
victim and the accused with the opportunity to play a more active role during the hearings. For 
example, the parties can interact directly and orally with the judge at any point throughout the 
hearing.121 The way the hearings are held makes the parties as well as the society in general to be 
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more involved in the functioning of the criminal justice system. As a result, it increases the 
legitimacy and credibility in the system.122 In addition, the system offers the possibility to solve 
the conflicts through various alternative resolution methods. The objective of the methods is to 
have an expedite process and to prevent the same behavior being committed repeatedly. 
 
Furthermore, Mexico made a major progress with the human rights constitutional reform in 2011. 
This goes hand-in-hand with the 2008 reform of the criminal justice system. The 2011 reform 
established the foundation for implementing international human rights standards and 
incorporating them into domestic law in Mexico. Among the most important elements of the reform 
is the requirement for the judges to analyze the compatibility of domestic laws and regulations and 
the ACHR (the American Convention on Human Rights)123, its additional protocols, and the 
jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court.124 
 
Although the state has taken the necessary steps to achieve a stronger protection of human rights 
through the justice system, it was expected that the accusatory system provided a more successful 
outcome. In reality, the transition from the old inquisitorial system to the accusatorial system has 
faced major challenges. For instance, the process of implementation has been one of the main 
difficulties of the transition. The accusatorial system is not going to be fully implemented until the 
cases opened under the inquisitorial system are concluded, which is going to take years.   
 
To give an instance, shortly before the transition deadline only prosecutors and judges had been 
fully trained. Even though the state had spent around US$ 25 million in training the agents that 
work under the justice system, the other agents, such as public defenders, police officers and 
experts had not received necessary training.125 This constitutes a major problem as the police 
officers along with the prosecutors are responsible for the most important aspects regarding the 
investigation in the cases. Therefore, the justice system requires specialized personnel in order to 
function. Yet, the police officers barely received an incomplete express traineeship with basic 
foundations but without the required specialization.126 
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Moreover, the alternative resolution methods are not widely chosen over the normal proceeding. 
According to data of the Attorney General’s Office (PGR), less than 10,000 cases out of a total of 
83,000 have been solved through negotiation or any other alternative method.127 The purpose to 
implement alternative methods was to allow solving less serious crimes in a more efficient manner. 
However, the authorities do not seem to be very comfortable implementing these methods as they 
rather continue carrying out the whole criminal procedure.  
 
Regarding precautionary measures, the reform also established that a monitoring unit of 
precautionary measures would be created. Nevertheless, this has not yet been done. It is an essential 
component of the reform because its purpose is to evaluate the risk posed by the detainees, and 
thus, the judge would be able to issue the most appropriate precautionary measure.128 In relation to 
this, Article 155 of the National Code of Criminal Procedures129 states that a possible precautionary 
measure is to place an electronic locator to the detainee. Yet again, this measure cannot be used. 
First, the state has not acquired any electronic locators, and second, there is no monitoring unit of 
precautionary measures that can supervise them.130 
 
A further challenge to the new accusatory system is to end the poor practices. The organization 
United Mexico Against Delinquency detected deficiencies or bad practices of judges, prosecutors, 
public defenders and public legal advisors in 94% of cases in the courts in Mexico City. Among 
the main failures are that orality is not favored, the principle of presumption of innocence is often 
violated and the prosecutors and legal advisors do not know how to perform under the new oral 
system.131 These shortcomings are alarming because it demonstrates that the practices of the 
previous inquisitorial system that obstructed professional investigations still remain. Therefore, it 
can be concluded that if the justice system does not function properly, the rights of the civilian 
population are not protected, and this consequently poses an obstacle for the country in its path 
towards a strong democracy. 
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2.1.2. Legal Framework and Practice of the Military Justice System  
 
In contemporary democracies, the function of the armed forces is to guarantee the country's 
security, sovereignty and national defense. This function must be exercised within a framework of 
rule of law, in conformity with national and international law and in line with the separation of 
powers and respect for human rights. For example, in Mexico the armed forces must act within the 
legal framework enshrined in the Constitution which establishes that military institutions depend 
directly on the executive power. This means the armed forces are subordinated to civil authority.132 
In a democracy where the rule of law and the separation of powers prevail, civilian control over 
the armed forces consists of several elements, such as accountability, transparency, access to 
military information and, most importantly, keeping military jurisdiction to matters strictly related 
to the armed forces.133  
 
In Mexico, the Secretariat of National Defense (SEDENA) is the institution responsible for 
managing the armed forces, both the army and the air forces. One of the main functions SEDENA 
is the administration of military justice. The military justice system is composed of the Supreme 
Military Tribunal, the Military Courts of Oral Proceedings, Military Detention Judges and 
Resolution Enforcement Judges. The military courts are composed only of military personnel with 
the exception of the public defender that can be civilian or military public defender. The rules and 
procedures of the military justice system are established in the Code of Military Justice.134 
 
The Constitution as the superior body of fundamental principles regulates the structure of the 
government and sets the outlines and limits of the political power. It also describes the essential 
aspects of the society from a democratic point of view.135 Some of these aspects are related to 
security matters that are also enshrined in the Constitutional text. It forms a hierarchy of tasks and 
fundamental norms within the government, including the very existence and fundamental powers 
of the armed forces. The legal framework and mandate of the armed forces was first established in 
the Constitution of 1917. Several articles were drafted in this regard with the intention to subject 
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the military power to the civil power, as well as to define its limits and functions, and to establish 
essential checks and balances. 
 
First, Article 13 establishes the limits of military justice which prohibit the military tribunals from 
having jurisdiction over civilians. Then, Article 89(VI) gives the power to the President to use the 
armed forces for internal security matters as well as for national defense. This provision specifically 
establishes the subordination of the members of military under the power of civil authority 
represented by the executive power. Furthermore, Article 129 sets out that no military authority 
may, in time of peace, perform any functions other than those that are directly connected with 
military affairs. Yet, the Constitution foresees the possibility that the army, the navy and the air 
force act in support of the civil authorities in tasks of public security. The conditions for this to 
happen include, first and foremost, that the civil authorities make a direct and well-founded request 
to the military authorities. This request has to be explicit that while supporting the civil authorities 
in public security tasks, the military will remain subordinated to them. Consequently, that means 
that the military power still remains subject to the fundamental principles embedded in the 
Constitution, as well as the laws that emanate from it and the treaties.136 Despite the fact that 
constitutionally it is possible for the armed forces to act in support of the civil authorities, this 
particular condition has not been thoughtfully respected. On the contrary, since 2006 it has been 
sorely abused as the military have widely taken control over of the police duties without a legal 
framework. 
 
Until now, it has been common for the armed forces to assume jurisdiction to investigate cases 
involving egregious abuses against civilians, like enforced disappearances, torture, arbitrary 
detentions, and sexual abuses. The general practice is that the Federal Public Ministry and local 
prosecutors customarily refer the cases to the military courts, thus depriving the civilian judges of 
their competence. It is a systematic practice that affects the rights of victims and the ability to seek 
and obtain a remedy by a competent court in accordance with due process. In this regard, Cossío 
Díaz,137 has expressed that the judiciary power is obliged to comply with the judgment of the Inter-
American Court in the Case of Radilla-Pacheco v. Mexico.138 This case establishes that military 
officers who commit crimes against civilians in their tasks of keeping security and fighting against 
crime should be judged by civilian and not by military authorities. 
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Mexico, as a state party to the ACHR, is under the obligation to respect and protect the rights and 
freedoms of its nationals. More specifically Article 8(1) and Article 25 of the ACHR recognize the 
right to a fair trial by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal and the right to judicial 
protection which guarantees the possibility of judicial remedy. It is very problematic to prosecute 
civilians in the military jurisdiction because there is both actual as well as perceived conflict of 
interest deriving from the military judges giving verdicts on their own personnel. Fundamentally, 
the military justice system lacks the necessary framework to investigate and to judge cases of 
alleged violations in an independent and impartial way.139 It is for that reason that two different 
jurisdictions exist, for military and civilian matters respectively, and as a consequence, they are 
two separate justice systems with their own framework of laws and their own distinct object.140 
Moreover, the Inter-American Court jurisprudence has also asserted that when a state has ratified 
the ACHR, its judges, as part of the state apparatus are subject to it. Therefore, the judges are under 
the obligation to ensure that the effects of the provisions of the ACHR are not undermined or 
ignored by the application of laws contrary to the ACHR.141  
 
Another serious consequence of exercising military jurisdiction over civilians is that impunity 
remains. When the military authorities carry out the investigations and as a result acquit the military 
officials in military courts, this prevents them from being tried before the civilian courts based on 
the principle non bis in idem.142 The maintenance of such practices implies an obvious risk that the 
general feeling of impunity will persist. This, in turn, jeopardizes the prospect of enhancing public 
security.143 For example, in the case La Cantuta v. Perú.144 the Inter-American Court observed that 
the state played an important role in obstructing the investigation in the ordinary jurisdiction, 
supporting instead the military justice intervention. The Court therefore pointed out that 
concealment and obstruction on behalf of the state prove the existence of a general sense of 
impunity.145 This illustrates a reality that also exists in Mexico where the support and acquiescence 
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of the state for these illegal practices undermine the justice system and democratic values. 
Consequently, it can be argued that Mexico cannot be considered a full democracy because the 
separation of powers between the civil and the military power does not prevail. 
 
Due to the absence of transparency in the system, the state is far from achieving its obligation to 
condemn military personnel for committing abuses against civilians. Whenever there is a case 
involving a flagrant violation of human rights of civilians, SEDENA, through the media, vaguely 
compromises to investigate the facts, and then usually does not give a thorough and comprehensive 
description of the facts of the case. On the contrary, it considers that the cases must stay confidential 
until a final judgment is reached. All information regarding the status of the cases of abuses 
committed by military members against civilians that are being investigated before the military 
tribunal is absolutely restricted to the public. Only those who are parties in the proceeding, such as 
the prosecutors, the public defenders, the accused and the victim have access to that information. 
However, very often the victims are reluctant to participate in the proceedings because of the fear 
of reprisals for testifying in front of military judges about violations and abuses perpetrated by their 
own personnel.146  
 
In some cases, SEDENA has granted compensation to the victims but frequently the victims do not 
fully obtain the appropriate compensation for the damage that has been caused.147 For example, 
according to several cases analyzed by Human Rights Watch, the military justice system tends to 
bring the investigations to an end arguing that it had not found enough evidence to convict the 
military members of any crime or they invoke statute of limitations on those particular crimes that 
are being investigated.148 In general, when there is no transparency and no accountability 
mechanisms in the justice system, the chances of obtaining justice are very slim.149 
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The lack of transparency in the system essentially prevents the society form realizing how effective 
the military justice system is and to what extent the members of the armed forces are being held 
accountable of their crimes. As the number of cases of violations committed by the military is 
rising, it indicates that there are no real measures of non-repetition against military abuses.150 The 
practices of the military justice system constitute a complete contradiction to the Constitution and 
the international treaties that protect and guarantee the fundamental rights of the civilians. This 
environment of systematic and endemic impunity has remained the norm causing irreparable 
damage to the society and causing a major setback to the development of the country.  
 
Finally, another problem that undermines the effectiveness and transparency of the system is that 
the military judges are denied judicial tenure unlike judges in the civil jurisdiction or the Supreme 
Court. Yet, the Code of Military Justice does establish that the judges are subject to the same 
rotation policies as other members of the armed forces. This aspect is crucial at the moment of 
rendering a judgment because it suggests that the judge could be biased in order to deliver a 
judgment that will satisfy the requests of his/her superior in rank. Therefore, it can also compromise 
the independence of the judges as they might fear being removed from their position or that their 
professional career can be hindered if a judgment does not please the views of the minister of 
defense.151 
 
2.1.3. Legal Challenges of the Code of Military Justice 
 
In 1933, President Abelardo L. Rodríguez, was granted an extraordinary power by the Congress to 
issue laws and regulations related to the armed forces. The President then issued the Code of 
Military Justice that as of today remains in force. Yet, Article 73(XV) of the Constitution confers 
the authority to prescribe the laws and regulations regarding the National Guard exclusively to the 
legislative power and prohibits the delegation of it to the executive power.152 Since the Code was 
not discussed in an assembly at the Congress, it has raised doubts whether the Code is constitutional 
as it was not issued according to the proceeding set forth in the Constitution.153  
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Even more importantly, Article 49 of the Constitution establishes the separation of powers and how 
these powers should never be united in one single person or entity. This article also clarifies that 
the legislative power shall never be vested in one individual except in the case of extraordinary 
powers granted to the executive. However, these extraordinary powers conferred to the executive 
are only granted in the event of emergency, invasion or disturbance of the public order.154 
Nonetheless, Mexico was not facing any of these circumstances when the Code entered into force. 
Consequently, it can be argued that the Code of Military Justice could be considered 
unconstitutional also because there was no condition that would have had allowed granting 
extraordinary powers to the President in order to issue laws related to the armed forces.  
 
On the other hand, there has been a debate among different international bodies like the Inter-
American Court, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (the Commission) and the UN 
Committee against Torture regarding the content of some provisions of the Code of Military 
Justice.155 For example, the Inter-American Court has issued four legally binding rulings requiring 
the amendment of Article 57(II) clause a).156 This Article regulates the use of military jurisdiction 
and defines what can be considered as an offense against the military discipline. Nonetheless, this 
provision has been traditionally interpreted by the military authorities to give itself jurisdiction 
over cases where combatants commit abuses and human rights violations against civilians. 
Consequently, it subjects the victims to a jurisdiction without independence and impartiality where 
there is not enough protection of their fundamental rights.157 
 
Moreover, Article 57 of the Code can also be considered unconstitutional because it does not 
guarantee the protection of the rights established in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 
Frequently the combatants commit acts where fundamental rights are violated outside the context 
of a service. Therefore, it is disputable how it can be considered that combatants carry out illicit 
conducts against civilians in an act of service and how can they be tried before military courts when 
they commit such acts.158   
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As a result of national and international pressure from governmental and non-governmental 
organizations, President Calderón presented a bill in 2010 which excluded only the crimes of 
enforced disappearance, torture and sexual assault from military jurisdiction.159 Other types of 
human rights violations that are often committed by the armed forces performing public security 
tasks were not considered, such as arbitrary arrests, extrajudicial executions or raids.160 
 
In 2012, in compliance with the judgment by the Inter-American Court in the case Radilla-Pacheco 
v. Mexico,161 the Supreme Court declared Article 57of the Code unconstitutional. It also requested 
it to be reformed so that the cases involving human rights violations committed by members of the 
armed forces would be investigated and prosecuted in the civilian courts instead of military 
courts.162  
 
Even though Articles 37, 49bis, 57 and 129 of the Code were reformed in 2014, it was not done 
properly because those provisions continue to hinder civilian investigations in various ways. For 
example, Article 37 enables the military authorities to be the first ones to conduct the investigation 
when a crime has been committed by a member of the armed forces. Only after the military have 
started the investigation, they notify the civil authorities about the case. This kind of practice 
obstructs the delivery of justice as it ends up in multiple investigations that are not conducted 
appropriately.163Additionally, Article 57 remained incompatible with the text of Article 13 of the 
Constitution.  Article 57 continues to be broad and vague and still does not fulfill the requirements 
set in the Court’s rulings. Furthermore, Article 49bis confers tasks to the military investigators, 
such as interviewing and protecting witnesses, ensuring the chain of custody, and preserving crime 
scenes, even though these tasks should belong to civilian investigations when there are civilians 
involved. In addition, Article 129 allows the detention of combatants who were charged with 
crimes and human rights violations against civilians in military prisons. Consequently, this can be 
a hindrance for civil authorities because it makes it more difficult to conduct interviews and obtain 
testimonies for their investigations.164 The reforms to the Code of Military Justice can be seen as a 
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positive step forward. Nevertheless, further reforms are required in order to be in conformity with 
the Constitution and the international human rights instruments that Mexico stands for.  
 
2.2. Attempts to Legalize the Use of the Armed Forces in Civilian Law 
Enforcement 
 
2.2.1. Internal Security Law 
 
In December 2017, the Congress enacted the Internal Security Law (ISL)165 in order to grant 
legitimacy and to establish clearer rules to the functions and tasks entrusted to the armed forces. 
The ISL sought to normalize the use of the armed forces in matters of public security by allowing 
the army and the navy to legally act as a civil force indefinitely. While the ISL intended to legalize 
the role of the armed forces in public security matters, it lacked necessary safeguards to protect 
human rights enshrined in the Constitution and in the treaties. 
 
The law extended the role of the armed forces and determined the situations where they could 
legally act in civilian matters, including domestic law enforcement.166 For that matter, the armed 
forces were granted with discretionary powers to create and implement security policies ranging 
from identifying internal security threats and the way to react to them, to the command of security 
operations and the gathering of intelligence from civil authorities.167 
 
However, the law did not include procedures for the civil authorities to oversee the functions 
performed by the armed forces during internal security operations. Neither did the law establish 
accountability mechanisms for combatants who commit abuses and violations of human rights 
during the military operations.168 As a result of such deficiencies, the CNDH, Mexico’s National 
Institute for Transparency, Access to Information and Protection of Personal Data (INAI) among 
other national bodies, lodged an action of unconstitutionality before the Supreme Court against 
several provisions of the ISL.169 An action of unconstitutionality is a means of control of the 
constitutionality of laws. It alleges a contradiction between the challenged law, in this case the ISL, 
and the Constitution. In Mexico, this process can only be reviewed by the Supreme Court. 
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The action of unconstitutionality included several significant arguments. First, it argued that the 
ISL approved the subordination of civil authorities to the military. Hence, violating Article 21 of 
the Constitution which specifically establishes that the matters of public security are a function that 
pertains to the civil authorities and to the judicial power.170 Also, it was argued that the law 
provided more extensive faculties to the armed forces to have recourse to any legal means to gather 
intelligence and information from civil institutions which, as a result, violates the citizens’ 
protection of personal data.171  
 
Moreover, the ISL granted to the executive power the authority to order the intervention of the 
armed forces when there would be a threat to internal security. In addition, the President could 
order the intervention while only discussing the matter with the National Security Council.172 Even 
though the law established that the intervention shall only be temporary and should not exceed one 
year, the President had been vested with enough power to extend the permanence of the armed 
forces when he/she considered that the threat to internal security continued to exist. Therefore, it 
can be argued that the permanent presence of the armed forces on the streets could indubitably 
consolidate a policy of militarization of the country.  
 
On the other hand, the law did not include the principles of absolute necessity or strict use of force 
by the armed forces. On the contrary, it conceded combatants to make use of their military training, 
which is remarkably alarming since the law also foresaw an increase of the role of combatants in 
response to civilian protests.173 This means that military intervention could be requested during 
social protests as they can be considered a threat to internal security. Therefore, it could be possible 
that the citizens feel intimidated or restrained to exercise their freedom of expression as they could 
be deemed as foes. The militarization of public security can put the core democratic values in 
jeopardy, destabilize the country and make it difficult to protect the rights of the citizens. In 
connection with this, it is important to mention that the definition of internal security in the ISL is 
very broad, making it highly susceptible to misinterpretations which could possibly lead to abuse 
in a significant number of situations. 
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Moreover, Article 9 of the ISL established that any information regarding the law’s enforcement 
would be confidential because it is considered as a matter of national security. However, the 
classification of information about the military practices poses an obstacle for the civil authorities 
to supervise them and contributes to the current climate of impunity given the lack of mechanisms 
to hold military personnel accountable when they commit wrongdoings.174  
 
Also, Article 20 of the ISL established that whenever the armed forces were deployed in interior 
security operations, the President would assign a military commander proposed by the armed forces 
that would devise the plan of action, assigned the tasks and coordinated the military and civilian 
authorities that were involved.175 Therefore, this provision of the law reaffirmed that the armed 
forces would not be appointed to perform an auxiliary role in public security, but instead they could 
replace civil authorities in their tasks. Consequently, the absence of effective civilian control over 
the armed forces would enable the military to act with even more autonomy, opacity and impunity.  
 
Some organs of the UN, the Inter-American Court, the CNDH, international human rights 
organizations and justice groups exhorted President Peña Nieto to turn down the law.176 In response 
to the pressure, the President stated in early 2018 that the law would not enter into force until the 
Supreme Court reviewed its constitutionality. In November 2018, the Supreme Court declared the 
ISL invalid and unconstitutional because it sought to normalize the use of the armed forces in 
matters of public security.177 This would compromise Mexico’s obligations, such as to promote, 
respect and guarantee the rights enshrined in the Constitution. Also the Court stated that the 
faculties and tasks of the armed forces given by the law are too comprehensive and therefore it 
allows the armed forces to act without limitations. Hence, the law strengthened the idea that the 
armed forces should be turned into police forces by allowing them to participate in civilian matters, 
such as civilian criminal investigations. Lastly, the Court declared that the Constitution does not 
authorize the Congress to legislate on matters related to internal security and external defense. 
Instead, the executive power is the one entitled to dispose of the army, the navy and the air force.  
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The final decision of the Supreme Court can be deemed as a step in the right direction. It 
corroborates that the ISL would only undermine the efforts to strengthen and professionalize 
civilian police forces. The terms of the law did not provide any direct benefit to the society in 
general but, on the contrary, it posed a risk to human rights because the armed forces lack 
appropriate training to deal with civilians. As a consequence, the ISL could be regarded as a 
continuation of a failed policy on security. The militarization of the country has led to a detrimental 
impact on the rule of law. The presence of the armed forces in the streets for the last decade has 
not reduced crime. Instead the crime rate has soared dramatically.  
 
2.2.2. Analysis of Legal Options for Reinforcing Public Security Forces  
 
The new President López Obrador proposed the creation of a National Guard with the aim to 
develop an alternative to the use of the armed forces to fight against organized criminal 
organizations already during the presidential campaign.178 The National Guard is intended to be 
the fundamental institution to prevent crime, to further public security and to fight against crime. 
President López Obrador stated in his National Peace and Security Plan 2018-2024 that this new 
institution will allow rectifying the legal vacuum in which the armed forces have been performing 
in auxiliary roles to support civil police in public security functions.179  
 
In March 2019, several Constitutional amendments were approved that pave the way for the 
framework for a National Guard.180 Among the most important amendments was the annulment of 
para. (XV) of Article 73. The para. (XV) established the exclusive authority of the legislative power 
to prescribe the laws and regulations regarding the National Guard and prohibited the delegation 
of it to the executive power. This can be regarded as a possible overlap in the functions of the 
executive and the legislative power if both would be allowed to regulate the use of armed forces.  
 
The government has so far allocated around US$ 767 million to finance the first year of operations 
of the National Guard.  The current administration also plans the construction of 87 bases for the 
new Guard.181 Initially, this new institution will consist of around 35,000 members that will come 
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from the military, naval police and the federal police. In addition, civilians and active troop 
members will be invited to be part of the National Guard expecting that the Guard reaches 50,000 
members.  
 
It was established that officers of the Mexican army and the navy will be in charge of the 
operational command of this new institution. For this reason, it was also decided that the National 
Guard will share the same outline of hierarchy and ranking as the armed forces.182 Even though the 
institution maintains the military component, the Guard will be of civil nature and is going to be 
under a civil control of the Ministry of Public Security which is integrated by SEDENA and 
SEMAR and the Secretariat of Security and Citizen Protection.183  
 
The National Peace and Security Plan also established that the new security corps will receive 
practical training provided by the Military Education System on police procedures, the use of force, 
criminal law, human rights, gender perspective, first aid and civil protection.184 In order to achieve 
this, the National Law to Regulate the Use of Force is one of the complementary laws that the 
Congress has to draft and approve when the Constitutional reform enters into force. This law is 
expected to establish the purpose and scope of the legitimate use of force. A second law that needs 
to be formulated is the National Law of the Registry of Detentions. This law is intended to establish 
a registry in cases of detentions, and it will determine the specifics of the registry, the treatment of 
personal data, the persons authorized to access the database, etc.185 
 
The President declared that the aim of the National Guard is the gradual demilitarization of the 
country by withdrawing the armed forces that are currently undertaking tasks of public security. 
This will allow the armed forces to return to their constitutional functions, such as national and 
external defense of the country.186 Hence, a three-year term was established for the Guard to be 
fully functional. To attain the demilitarization of the public security, a five-year term has been 
established, so that the military can return to their barracks. This timeframe notwithstanding, the 
current administration has not been clear on which will be the plan of action to realize this. 187 
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While the National Peace and Security Plan intends to create a legal framework as well as 
demilitarize the country, it lacks the clarity on how the National Guard will achieve its goals. For 
example, the Plan declared that the Guard was designed to guarantee peace in the country. Yet, the 
operational plan how the institution would contribute to a more secure and peaceful Mexico is not 
explained. Also, it mentions the eradication of corruption, but then again, there are no strategies or 
policies on how exactly the new institution will accomplish such objectives. 
 
More importantly, the Plan does not even mention what would be the accountability mechanisms 
to hold the new security corps accountable in case they commit abuses against civilians. The lack 
of accountability mechanisms has increased the chance of the military to act with opacity for 
decades. This has been one of the key obstacles in the path of strengthening the protection of human 
rights. Experience in Mexico has shown that it is not possible to fight against crime without proper 
strategies and clear concepts that can differentiate the attributions and responsibilities of the 
authorities in charge of public and national security. 
 
The previous administrations promised to revolutionize the fight against organized crime by 
implementing constitutional and institutional reforms, but ultimately, they did not have a positive 
impact in reducing violence. Consequently, the new President promised during his campaign that 
the National Guard would be different from anything else that has been tried by his predecessors. 
However, after an analysis of the National Peace and Security Plan, it can be concluded that it is 
deficient as there is not much depth in the planning of the function and institutional counterweights 
of the Guard, and more importantly, it does not differ much from the idea of the national militarized 
police force, or gendarmerie proposed by President Peña Nieto. The Plan also lacks substantial 
methods and strategies for accomplishing the demilitarization of the country over a longer term. 
 
The creation of a National Guard has been heavily criticized by activists and academia because it 
is considered to continue the militarization of public security.188 Its members still come from 
military bodies, such as the Military and Naval police, many being active members of the armed 
forces. The new security corps will be trained by the military and, even though the Guard is said 
to be of civil nature, it will still be commanded by SEDENA and SEMAR. In this sense, it can be 
said that there would not be a considerable change in the way of taking care of public security. 
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Possibly the only difference will be that when the Law on the National Guard comes into force, the 
armed forces will finally have a legal framework that regulates their actions.  
 
So far there are no guarantees that this new institution will truly be civilian. It can be written in the 
reform that the Guard will be of civil nature, however, it is important to remember that also the 
armed forces are supposed to be subject to civil control. This, however, has to a vast degree been 
ignored in practice. It can be argued that if the Guard is going to be so heavily influenced by the 
military, it will continue the same practices that have been taking place since the armed forces were 
deployed to fight against criminal organizations. 
 
What is more, the creation of the National Guard will slow down and undermine the efforts to 
strengthen, restructure and professionalize civilian police forces of the country. Employing 
combatants for public security matters cannot serve as a substitution for the improvement of 
civilian police forces. Combatants and local police officers are not interchangeable. Civilian police 
are responsible for the application of laws and public stability, whereas combatants are trained to 
fight the enemy through the use of force. Particularly, combatants are not endowed with criminal 
investigative powers in cases concerning civilians and, moreover, they do not specialize to interact 
with the civilian population.189 After more than a decade of having a permanent presence of the 
armed forces on the streets without having any success in reducing crime and violence, there are 
well-grounded doubts about the feasibility of transforming combatants into police.  
 
In addition, the local police forces should not be disregarded, and more resources should be 
allocated to prepare them for effectively fighting against crime. By law, the police forces should 
be the ones in charge of public security. This includes safeguarding the rights of the people as well 
as the powers to investigate and prosecute crimes. In connection with this, when the Congress 
approves a Law on the National Guard, different functions of the civilian members and the military 
members of the Guard must be defined with clarity. The military members should only be allowed 
to act exceptionally and should not be allowed to participate in the investigation of crimes.190 It 
goes without saying that the forthcoming Law on the National Guard has to fulfill international 
human rights standards in all respects.  
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At the moment, the public security model remains undefined. For the National Guard to function, 
several reforms are needed. First and foremost, accountability mechanisms and effective civilian 
control mechanisms must be in place. If both mechanisms are correctly implemented, the National 
Guard could prove to be a positive step in regard to the protection of human rights. Previous 
administrations used the armed forces without a legal framework and without accountability 
mechanisms to subject the armed forces to civilian control. The next chapter will demonstrate the 
consequences and risks related to the use of the armed forces without a proper public security 
strategy that protects human rights.  
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CHAPTER III. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS RESULTING FROM 
MILITARIZATION OF PUBLIC SECURITY 
 
3.1. Militarization of Public Security in Practice and its Consequences  
 
For decades the Mexican government has engaged in a fight against crime and criminal 
organizations. Since 1930, Mexico was governed by the hegemonic PRI that held the power for 70 
years. During that time, drug-trafficking was deeply linked with and subdued to political power.191 
The arrangement between the government and the drug cartels was quite simple. The cartels needed 
to observe a set of rules called code of conduct in order to perform illegal activities.192 The criminal 
organizations kept functioning discreetly and in an exceptionally disciplined manner up until 1990s 
by operating in the absence of major confrontations between each other.193 
 
As Mexico was ruled by an authoritarian party, it functioned as a de facto centralized country 
capable of punishing the cartels in all different levels of government. Federal, state and local level 
were well-integrated and acted in harmony to punish a criminal organization whenever it was 
involved in a violent confrontation that could cause reputational damage to the country.194 
However, drug-related crime started to become a major problem since 2000 when the first 
multiparty democratic government was headed by the National Action Party (PAN).195 The levels 
of government were controlled by different political parties after the 2000 elections and, as a 
consequence, decision-making became fragmented and ambiguous. The change in politics played 
a crucial role in setting the conditions for the criminal organizations to diversify and increased the 
proneness to violently fight each other.196 
 
Since early 2000s an extensive role in public security has been entrusted to the military forces. The 
militarization of public security was administered in the absence of any solid legal grounds. When 
former President Felipe Calderón (2006-2012) formally initiated an aggressive war on drugs in 
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2006, the scale and intensity of violence increased throughout Mexico resulting in tens of thousands 
of casualties and people internally displaced.  
 
The Calderón administration recognized the organized crime as a threat to national security and 
made it the top priority. The war on drugs formally commenced when the President launched the 
Joint Operation Michoacán sending federal police forces, combatants and members of the naval 
forces to fight criminal organizations in the state of Michoacán.197 From that point, President 
Calderón also ordered the deployment of the armed forces throughout the states where drug-
trafficking and violence were a dominant issue.  
 
In order to combat criminal organizations, the Calderón administration endorsed a strategy of 
enhanced law enforcement with two main elements: (1) military intervention in several states of 
the country to support local police forces, and (2) to hunt down and eliminate the leaders of the 
cartels. The first element was the militarization of public security.198 In this regard, President 
Calderón deployed some 50,000 military troops and an undefined number of navy members over 
different states to support the federal and local police forces.199 Nonetheless, military personnel 
were not only supporting but extensively took over control of the duties generally performed by 
local police forces.200 The armed forces were assigned to patrol the streets, set up and operate 
random checkpoints, operate permanently located checkpoints on the highways, destroy drug 
distribution centers, guarding and operating prisons, make arrests and raids. Likewise, the members 
of navy began managing customs operations in seaports.201 By 2012, at least 32,000 members of 
the armed forces were carrying out tasks customarily executed by civilian forces.202 In some 
instances military commanders and ex-commanders were appointed head of the public security 
agencies and other different local police institutions.203 
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It could be argued that using military forces to take on police tasks is in some regards indispensable 
and helps to fight the surging criminal activity. Several aspects have been pointed out why there 
has been a positive impact on the fulfilling of police tasks. (1) Military members and ex-members 
of the armed forces have taken over traditional civilian posts in law enforcement agencies, while 
in some states and municipalities the previous chiefs of top security posts have resigned due to the 
danger imposed by the criminal organizations. (2) Many officers, such as generals, colonels or 
admirals that have been assigned to posts at local public security agencies had vast experience 
battling the organized crime. (3) In most of the cases the officers maintain a relationship with the 
current military commanders; this relationship helps the officers when they need to develop combat 
strategies, allowing them to perform joint operations or assaults against drug-trafficking 
organizations. (4) Due to their profession, military officers have become familiar with the usual 
tactics and strategies of the criminal organizations. (5) Military members come from a very strict 
environment of discipline and high standards and, therefore, it could help to improve the 
performance of the local police forces.204 (6) Public opinion has supported the fact that military 
officers who have attained proper training and firm discipline in the armed forces are competent to 
take over security positions.205 In fact, a public opinion survey on the perception of confidence in 
the authorities from 2018 revealed that over 80% of the people feel confident about the army and 
navy, whereas less than 50% are confident about the state police or municipal preventative 
police.206 
 
On the other hand, the deployment of the armed forces on the streets to perform public security 
tasks endangers the principle of the use of force. This is one of the key principles of law 
enforcement that is rigorously followed by democratic states. While using force is indeed permitted 
in exercising statutory police tasks, it is strictly limited. Excessive use of force is prohibited by any 
means. The armed forces, however, are unequivocally trained for the maximum use of force. This 
is incompatible with the training of police forces and with the principle of the use of force as it is 
known in law enforcement. Empowering Mexican armed forces with regular police tasks 
undoubtedly puts the principle of the use of force in peril.207 Because of their training, the 
combatants have little experience interacting with civilians.  
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In addition, it is important to acknowledge that the purpose of the armed forces is to defend the 
country against external threats, to defend the integrity, independence and sovereignty of the 
nation. These are actions related more to the protection of the national security. Contrary to that, 
public security has a different nature, mainly to safeguard the integrity and the rights of the people, 
preserve public order and peace, etc. Consequently, these tasks should only be entrusted to civil 
forces. Hence, instead of entrusting tasks related to public security to the armed forces, 
strengthening civil police and reinforcing effective public policies under democratic principles 
would be more in line with the customary division of tasks between the armed forces and civil 
forces.208  
 
Furthermore, it is paramount to comprehend that there are more issues involving the militarization 
of public security. Throughout the years members of the armed forces have fulfilled tasks of local 
police forces without any legal framework. The lack of legal framework also means that there are 
no proper mechanisms of accountability in case of serious human rights violations of the civilian 
population. The deployment of the armed forces has been linked with a dramatic increase in cases 
of enforced disappearances, extrajudicial executions, arbitrary detentions and torture. According 
to the National Human Rights Commission (CNDH), in the past years the claims for violations of 
human rights filed against military personnel have been increasing severely.209 Examples of cases 
of human rights violations will be described below in sub-chapter 3.2. 
 
The second element of the strategy launched by President Calderón was to chase down and 
eliminate the drug lords. As the drug lords were captured or killed, the cartels fragmented and 
diversified, leading to clashes among competing cartels over the control of the territory.210 Because 
of the escalation in the intensity of confrontations between the armed forces and the cartels, the 
situation in Mexico as of 2017 was compared to armed conflicts in the territories of different 
countries like Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Syria, Turkey and Yemen.211  
 
It is crucial to acknowledge that this element of the strategy led to a dramatic increase in violence 
because Mexico lacked flexible local law enforcement that would have had the capacity to contain 
the emergence of smaller but more numerous new criminal actors that are involved in wider 
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spectrum of criminal activities.212 The levels of violence worsened both in qualitative and 
quantitative terms. Qualitatively, the methods of assassination evolved to an unprecedented level 
of cruelty. For instance, the cartels have started to bring tortured, dismembered and decapitated 
bodies to public display.213 As a consequence of the cartel’s fragmentation, they became deeply 
involved in other criminal activities against civilians that have expanded from the drugs business 
to kidnapping, human trafficking, extortion etc. Over recent years, they have also engaged in 
constant attacks against the state and security officials.214 Quantitatively, the number of homicides 
increased particularly since President Calderón introduced the policy to fight the criminal 
organizations. The violence that started in the wake of the war on drugs has not come to a halt. 
Statistics revealed that the number of homicides had increased more than three times since 2006, 
reaching 33,300 in 2018.215 Preliminary figures for 2018 indicate a further increase, breaking the 
record of the highest annual number of homicides for the second consecutive year.216 Statistics 
clearly prove a colossal failure by the state to protect its citizens from the violence perpetrated by 
criminal organizations. 
 
Former President Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-2018) promised to shift the focus of the security 
strategy that his predecessors had already tried against the organized crime. The focal point of his 
security strategy was crime prevention and decreasing criminal violence that have a direct effect 
on the civilian population rather than haunting down the cartel leaders.217 In order to achieve his 
objective, Peña Nieto’s administration put into effect another security strategy which involved the 
creation of a national militarized police force, or gendarmerie. The new security force was assigned 
to safeguard civilians from crime.218 Nevertheless, it can be noted that Peña Nieto’s administration 
security approaches were rather similar to President Calderón’s. 
 
The next crucial attempt to reinforce public security was made in December 2017. Despite criticism 
from national and international human rights organizations, the Congress approved the 
controversial ISL which would allow the army and the navy to legally act as a civil force 
indefinitely. President Peña Nieto faced domestic and international pressure, so he requested the 
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law to be reviewed by Mexico’s Supreme Court to ensure that its provisions did not violate the 
Constitution prior to taking effect.219 In 2018, the Supreme Court ruling overturned the ISL arguing 
that the law was unconstitutional, inter alia, because it sought to normalize the use of the armed 
forces in matters of public security which is contrary to Article 129 of the Constitution.220 
 
Currently, the security situation in Mexico remains complex. The law enforcement institutions are 
weak and ineffective. The previous administration allocated a considerable amount of economic 
resources for national and public security. However, the results were not as expected.221 So far, the 
outcome of the militarization of public security has resulted in increasing violence, social instability 
and systematic human rights violations. 
 
In point of fact, there is mounting evidence of state abuse and collusion with the organized crime.222 
Even though the state is under domestic and international obligation to ensure the safety and 
protection of its citizens and their fundamental rights; enforced disappearances, arbitrary 
detentions, extrajudicial executions, torture and sexual violence committed by the military against 
civilians have become a regular feature of life. Consequently, the deficiencies in the legal system 
have fueled the risk of abuse by state agents and the military.  
 
More importantly, non-derogable rights, such as the right to life223 or the right to be free from 
torture and other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, are among the most violated 
rights by the armed forces. In addition, other rights, such as the right to privacy, right to personal 
liberty or right to a fair trial are predominantly breached not only by military officers but also by 
local authorities. While the majority of the homicides are drug-related, the ongoing life-threatening 
violence can be partly attributed to the state. In connection with that, the thesis will now turn its 
focus into documenting three cases to give examples on violations related to enforced 
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disappearance, extrajudicial executions and torture respectively. The description of the cases aims 
to demonstrate how militarization of public security endangers the protection of human rights and 
undermines the rule of law. Furthermore, while military forces were deployed in the tasks of public 
security to protect the civilians, these cases cast doubt on whether any of such goals have been 
accomplished. In particular, the cases will illustrate how vulnerable the civilian population has 
become since the militarization of the country. Moreover, the widespread corruption and impunity 
that takes place within the criminal justice system are also revealed by the cases. 
 
3.2. Adverse Implications on Human Rights Resulting from Inadequate 
Control of the Use of Armed Forces  
 
3.2.1. Enforced Disappearance  
 
In Latin America, enforced disappearances have traditionally been part of a strategy used by the 
armed forces, the security forces, intelligence services, or paramilitary groups that act with the 
involvement and tolerance of the state.224 Contemporary Mexico is not an exception, with tens of 
thousands of cases documented225 there is ample evidence suggesting that members of the army, 
navy, security forces and other public officials have participated in enforced disappearances.226  
 
Experts from the UN, the CNDH and human rights activists have noticed that since the policy 
against drugs was launched, enforced disappearances have become a common occurrence in 
Mexico.227 Usually, the cases tend to follow a consistent pattern where the victims are arbitrarily 
arrested by members of the armed forces or law enforcement agents, they are not informed of the 
reasons for their arrest, their arrest is not officially documented on the data bases of the police and 
they are not taken immediately before the relevant authorities. More serious still, the local 
authorities systematically misclassify the enforced disappearances cases as missing persons, 
kidnappings by drug cartels or they frequently blame the victims of having been targets due to their 
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participation in criminal activities.228 The misclassification is one of the main reasons why keeping 
accurate data on enforced disappearances is remarkably problematic.   
 
Enforced disappearances remain widespread and often give the means to other human rights 
violations. Due to the increasing numbers of disappearances, the Congress approved the Law on 
Forced Disappearances in 2017.229 However, since the law entered into force there has been a lack 
of political will to fully put it into practice. Yet, if implemented conscientiously, critical aspects 
concerning prevention, investigation and punishment for those responsible could be appropriately 
tackled. Albeit Mexico has ratified numerous international human rights treaties,230 the state has 
not been able to act with due diligence to protect human rights and has, thus, failed to uphold its 
obligations under IHRL.  
 
On the other hand, another serious issue is the state’s failure to guarantee justice to victims and 
their families. Many cases of enforced disappearances perpetrated by military members are 
investigated and tried in the Mexican military justice system. Hence, it may well be the reason why 
no military officials have been convicted of this crime in the military courts.231 This section will 
focus on the description and analysis of the case Alvarado Espinoza y otros v. México. This is the 
first case ever submitted to the Inter-American Court concerning enforced disappearance that has 
taken place as part of the operations against drug-related crimes carried out by the Mexican army.232 
 
On December 29, 2009, in the municipality of Buenaventura, Chihuahua, Nitza Paola Alvarado 
Espinoza (Nitza) and José Ángel Alvarado Herrera (José) were arbitrarily arrested by ten-armed 
combatants while they were inside a vehicle outside a relative’s house.233 José’s wife, Obdulia, was 
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inside the house when she saw the members of the armed forces arriving in two pick-up trucks, 
beating José and then taking both away in the trucks. Later that day, Rocio Irene Alvarado Reyes 
(Rocio) was at home with her mother Patricia, her two younger siblings and her two-year old 
daughter, when the same ten-armed combatants burst into her home. Patricia and the children were 
threatened and locked in the bathroom. Afterwards, the combatants stated that Rocio was being 
arrested under the Joint Operation Chihuahua and was taken out of her house and then forced into 
a truck.234 The whereabouts of the three victims remain unknown.  
 
The relatives of Nitza, José and Rocio reported the situation to the community police and also to 
the local office of the State Attorney General, but the authorities declined to file a complaint. As 
the authorities were not helpful, the family itself went around the town to look for the victims but 
was unsuccessful.235  
 
Finally, on December 31, 2009, the authorities from the local office of the State Attorney General 
received the complaint and told the relatives that “they had information three people were in the 
barracks of the 35th Infantry Battalion and were being investigated by the army”.236 The family 
members went to the barracks to request information but upon arrival they were told no one had 
been detained and they did not have information about them.237 After that, the family members 
filed complaints for the illegal deprivation of liberty of Nitza, José and Rocio by members of the 
military at the Federal Investigative Agency. However, at the agency the officers declared they 
were unaware of the victims’ detention. Later that day, the relatives reported the incident at the 
National Human Rights Commission of Ciudad Juárez.238 
 
In January 2010, the family members filed another complaint at the Attorney General’s Office. 
While at the office, they heard someone saying that in fact the victims were detained at the military 
barracks. Subsequently, the relatives went to the Fifth Military Zone in Chihuahua City to report 
the arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance of Nitza, José and Rocio.239 
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In late January, the family members filled a new complaint under enforced disappearance instead 
of missing persons at the State Attorney General of Chihuahua. According to a family member, on 
February 3, Nitza called to a friend saying, “Please help me, get me out of here, I’m scared.”240 
The family reported this to the authorities, but they did not take it seriously and did not do an 
effective investigation about it.  
 
During the alleged investigation, the family members were told in several occasions by different 
authorities and witnesses that the Lieutenant Colonel of the 35th Infantry Battalion, Elfego Luján 
Ruiz, committed illegal acts during the period he was Colonel such as the arbitrary detention and 
enforced disappearance of Nitza, José and Rocio.241 
 
In April 2010, the case was taken under the military jurisdiction and several proceedings were 
conducted, such as testimonies of both civilians and combatants, analysis of documents from 
different law enforcement agencies, state and private institutions. In 2011, the Military Public 
Ministry stated based on their investigation that members of the Mexican army did not commit any 
illicit acts. In addition, the Ministry pointed that victims could have been targets claiming that they 
might have been involved in drug-trafficking. Having concluded this, they sent the case to the 
Federal Public Ministry so they could take on the investigation.242  
 
Since the victims disappeared, their families had been threatened and intimidated by members of 
the Mexican army. According to family members, armed combatants had been seen patrolling 
outside their houses and several times they had been inside their homes conducting interrogations. 
In addition, José’s father had received death threats over the phone.243Another time, other family 
members were threatened to be killed if they did not leave the city. This threat was allegedly made 
by members of SEDENA. Other violent incidents happened, like when José’s brother, Jaime, was 
run over by a truck like the ones the armed forces drive. Lastly Jaime’s wife found out a note inside 
their ransacked house stating, “we will kill your family”. In 2011, after all these events, José’s 
father and twenty-one more family members decided to flee the city.244 
 
                                               
240 Meyer, Brewer, Cepeda, op. cit., p. 7. 
241 Informe no.3/16, p. 19. 
242 Ibid., p. 24. 
243 Ibid., p. 41. 
244 Ibid., p. 43. 
 59 
The victims’ families felt the state failed to properly investigate with due diligence as none of the 
complaints and reports led to any progress in the investigation of the whereabouts or fate of Nitza, 
José and Rocio. On June 26, 2011, they filed an application with the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights. There were several reasons why the Commission decided the case involved the 
enforced disappearance of Nitza, José and Rocio by members of the Mexican army. There was 
enough evidence based on eyewitness, testimonies, statements of law enforcement authorities, 
contextual factors and various reports from several agencies that led the Commission to the 
conclusion that the victims were deprived of their liberty by members of the Mexican army.245 
 
In its Merits Report, the Commission made several recommendations to Mexico, however after 
granting an extension of time to comply with the recommendations, the state has failed to do it. 
Therefore, on November 9, 2016, the Commission submitted the case to the Court’s jurisdiction.246 
In November 2018, the Court rendered the final judgment where it found the state liable of gross 
violations of human rights of Nitza, José, Rocio and their close relatives and ordered the state to 
compensate the family of the victims.247  
 
This case demonstrates the dangers of the militarization of public security and it proves how the 
state authorities have perpetrated systematic human rights violations. The deployment of the armed 
forces has not contributed to the safety of the population and neither has helped to reduce violence. 
On the contrary, it has led to grave abuses, impunity and human rights violations.248 The numerous 
violations of human rights of both the direct victims and their families will be explained as 
following. 
 
First of all, the victims’ right to personal liberty and right to humane treatment was violated when 
members of the armed forces arbitrary deprived them of their physical liberty. More importantly, 
during the arrest, the combatants violated Article 16 of the Constitution which enshrines that no 
one shall be molested except by virtue of a written order issued by a competent authority describing 
the legal grounds and justification.249 However, the victims were arbitrarily arrested without being 
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informed of the grounds for their arrest. By analyzing the facts and evidence, it was proved that the 
competent authorities did not issue a written order of arrest against the victims. This is beyond 
doubt a grave violation of the fundamental rights protected by the Constitution and other human 
rights treaties.  
 
In regard to the right to be free of inhuman treatment, eyewitnesses reported the victims were 
physically and verbally abused. Testimonies of the relatives that were present during the arrest 
informed that the victims and themselves were not treated with dignity and respect. Contrary, they 
were ill-treated and threatened by the combatants. Moreover, Article 19 of the Constitution states 
in its last paragraph that ill-treatment and abuse during the detention shall be punishable by law 250, 
however, as of today, no member of the armed forces has been held accountable for the abuses and 
violations in this particular case.251 
 
Concerning the right to life of the victims and based on the evidence and documentation of the 
case, there are strong indications that the victims might not be alive anymore. It has been nine years 
since their disappearance and there is no information about them or their whereabouts.  
 
Another important aspect that contributed to the failure of the investigation were the proceedings 
violations. First, there was a lack of proper investigation within a reasonable time; the case was 
handled by various law enforcement agencies and there were plenty of in-progress case files in 
each agency which made the investigation ineffective and unsuccessful. In this regard, the 
Commission has emphasized that the states part of the Organization of American States (OAS) 
have the responsibility to provide easy, fast and efficient remedy to comply with this obligation.252 
However, the case was transferred to the military jurisdiction. As a result of that the families of the 
victims were deprived of the right to judicial protection to access a competent, independent tribunal 
to seek justice. According to Article 9 of the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance 
of Persons, civilian investigations should be tried under the jurisdiction of ordinary law and all 
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other special jurisdictions, especially the military should be excluded.253 In addition, Article 13 of 
the Constitution also prohibits the military tribunals to have jurisdiction over civilians.254 Although 
the case was later transferred back to the ordinary jurisdiction, the period of time the case was 
under military jurisdiction was crucial for gathering vital information and evidence about the fate 
of the victims.  
 
On the other hand, during the course of the investigation there were several means of cover-up and 
obstructions on behalf of the state authorities; as it was mentioned before, some authorities 
mentioned to the family members that they did have information about the victims and then later 
denied it. According to the Commission, the ACHR highlights that the families of the victims of 
enforced disappearance have the right to know the truth about what happened to their beloved 
ones.255 The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has 
also stated that the right to know the truth about gross violations of human rights is an inalienable 
right linked to the obligation of the state to protect and guarantee human rights. Furthermore, it 
underlines the obligation of the state to conduct effective investigations, ensure adequate remedies 
and provide reparation for the victims and their families.256 This right consists of two main aspects. 
First, the victims and their families have the right to the truth regarding the events that caused 
human rights violations. Second, those involved have the right to know the identity of those who 
perpetrated these violations.257 The Court has pointed out that the deprivation of the right to the 
truth of the facts about the whereabouts of the disappeared persons constitutes a form of cruel and 
inhumane treatment for close relatives.258 
 
Furthermore, the victims’ families were constantly the objects of arbitrary interference with their 
private life, family and home. After the detention and disappearance of their relatives, they were 
under constant surveillance and harassment by members of the armed forces. They did not enjoy 
privacy even at their home because it was common for the combatants to show up there to threaten 
them. The imminent danger, intimidation and threats against them ultimately provoked the forced 
displacement of more than twenty family members.  
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In the light of the above, it can be concluded that the Mexico failed to protect and guarantee the 
fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution as well as in human rights treaties. The massive 
and systematic violation of human rights and serious violation of IHRL by state agents and 
members of the military are a clear indication of the inability of the state to maintain public order 
and the security of the country. The government’s failure to solve the case after almost nine years 
forced the family members to resort to international bodies to seek justice. The circumstances of 
the case prove a recurrent conduct where the members of the armed forces commit crimes and 
conduct illegal activities with the support and acquiescence of the state. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that the recursive violations of human rights and impunity for military abuses have led 
the country to retreat from the principles of rule of law.  
 
3.2.2. Extrajudicial Execution 
 
Extrajudicial executions are not a recent problem in Mexico. Its background dates back to the 1960s 
and 1970s to the period known as the Mexican Dirty War. During that time the political party PRI, 
supported by the United States, carried out measures of military and political repression aimed at 
dissolving the movements of students as well as the political opposition and rural insurgents. Since 
then, enforced disappearances, killings, torture, and extrajudicial executions have been a systematic 
practice of the state through the armed forces.259  
 
The situation has not changed considerably. Since the policy on public security was launched in 
2006, the militarization of public security has been characterized by human rights violations, the 
blatant disregard for the international human rights standards and the lack of accountability 
mechanisms for the perpetrators. As a consequence of the war on drugs, the military personnel and 
local police have been prone to become subjects of threats from members of the organized crime. 
Therefore, it may be possible that some civilian deaths are the result of the legitimate use of force 
during the violent confrontations.260 Nevertheless, the number of deaths due to extrajudicial 
executions involving excessive use of force has been rising every year.261  
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The state has been striving to prove the legitimacy of its public security strategy, but the reality has 
been that numerous homicides have been attributed to the state. 262 Therefore, in order to legitimize 
its actions, the state started to adopt a strategy to deny their character as victims. This means that 
the victims were classified as collateral damage263 or as being part of criminal organizations 
without any prior investigation to support such claims.264 The so-called collateral damage has been 
regarded as an outcome of the confrontations between the armed forces and the criminal 
organizations. Nevertheless, it has served as a pretext for the authorities to not take responsibility 
for their actions. Unfortunately, the number of victims that pertain to the category of collateral 
damage is outrageous. Even though no official statistics on the exact number of victims can be 
found, a great number of cases have been reported in newspapers.  
 
In addition to that, the degree of impunity regarding extrajudicial executions is alarming as a large 
number of cases are not being investigated. However, when the cases are investigated, the relevant 
authorities tend to commit wrongdoings that include, inter alia, the ballistic examination or not 
bringing under interrogation the combatants or police that were involved. Besides, there has been 
an ongoing practice where the crime scenes are manipulated by the combatants or police in order 
to erroneously incriminate the victims as armed assailants/part of the organized crime or to conceal 
evidence of the excessive use of force.265 The case that will be examined in this section is a model 
example of innocent civilians that were caught up in the middle of a crossfire between the armed 
forces and the organized crime and later were denied of their character as victims. The case was 
submitted to the CNDH in 2010.266 
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On March 19, 2010, university students Javier Francisco Arredondo Verdugo (Javier) and Jorge 
Antonio Mercado Alonso (Jorge) were arbitrarily executed inside the premises of the Monterrey 
Institute of Technology and Higher Education (ITESM) during a clash between the Mexican army 
and alleged organized crime members. Members of the armed forces under the command of 
SEDENA, were patrolling the streets in Monterrey, Nuevo León, nearby the ITESM. Soon that 
night, the combatants were involved in a high-speed car chase where suspects started to attack the 
combatants from another vehicle with assault rifles and machine guns. The violent confrontation 
between the armed forces and the attackers took place outside the premises of the ITESM and 
lasted around forty-five minutes.267 
Amidst the clash, a videotape from the ITESM security cameras filmed Jorge and Javier walking 
inside the premises of the university. Right after, the video showed military personnel from 
SEDENA going inside the Campus close to where the students were walking. A security guard 
from the Campus testified seeing the combatants shooting and later finding the students lying 
wounded and unconscious. The same videotape that recorded the last minutes of the students’ lives 
also revealed how combatants destroyed other security cameras, quite possibly to get rid of the 
evidence of the crime they just committed. Furthermore, the head of security on Campus stated that 
a member of the armed forces demanded him to turn over the videotapes from the cameras that 
were not destroyed.268 
 
Evidence also demonstrated that the crime scene was modified by the members of the armed forces 
with the intention to implicate the students as part of the organized crime and that they perished as 
a consequence of the clash. The forensic report also confirmed signs of torture. The victims were 
brutally beaten while still alive and then shot six and seven times respectively. The autopsy 
revealed that some of the gunshots were made at close proximity which contravened the facts stated 
by the combatants that the shooting occurred during the chase. Also, the combatants moved the 
bodies of the students into different positions and planted firearms on the bodies of the victims in 
order to make them look like armed assailants. As well, the victims’ IDs and their belonging were 
missing. It could be assumed they were stolen for the purpose of hiding the real identities of the 
victims.269 
 
                                               
267 Ibid., p. 18.  
268 Ibid., p. 2. 
269 Ibid. 
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The first report issued by the Commander of the Seventh Military Zone established that both 
students were members of the organized crime and were on-board of the vehicle that attacked the 
combatants and, therefore, the combatants killed them during the collision. According to the 
members of the armed forces that were present during the clash, the students came out of the vehicle 
with firearms and ran towards the ITESM premises to escape from them.270  
 
However, all the statements given by SEDENA, the Seventh Military Zone and the combatants that 
were present at the confrontation were proved to be false. There was enough evidence, 
eyewitnesses like the security guards of campus, testimonies of other students, the videotape from 
the security camera and, importantly, the personal and academic background of the students which 
by all accounts proved that they were excellent students. All of the evidence contradicted the 
authorities report. The evidence gathered by the CNDH and the ITESM proved Javier and Jorge 
were respectively a PhD and master’s student from the ITESM that used to stay late to study at the 
Campus. Along with additional evidence, it was confirmed they were not part of the organized 
crime and the videotapes from the Campus corroborated they did not possess firearms as claimed 
by SEDENA members.271  
 
Mexico’s judiciary system has proved to be weak and this has allowed the security forces to enjoy 
certain immunities and protection by special jurisdictions which have ended in an unbearable 
impunity that governs the country. In principle, members of the armed forces are trained to abstain 
from using excessive public force save when it is strictly necessary and inevitable. However, the 
arbitrary use of force by the armed forces has become a standard practice. More seriously, it has 
become a common practice to excessively use force in public spaces where civilians can easily be 
injured.  
 
Although the Military’s Manual on the Use of Force (the Manual) was published in 2014, the 
military personnel do not always follow the rules on the correct use of firearms. For example, the 
manual establishes the prohibition to shoot at moving vehicles because it amounts to an excessive 
use of lethal force.272 Nevertheless, the members of the armed forces tend to engage in high 
intensity violent confrontation without taking into account whether there is an imminent risk to 
third parties as it was the case with Javier and Jorge. In addition, there were other grave violations 
                                               
270 Ibid., p. 24. 
271 Ibid., p. 20. 
272 Manual del Uso de la Fuerza, de aplicación común a las tres Fuerzas Armadas (The Military’s Manual on the Use 
of Force). Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional, Secretaría de Marina, e.i.f. 22.05.2014, Mexico, p. 12 para. 14a. 
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regarding the manipulation of the scene and the evidence. For example, the Manual states that in 
case civilians are injured or dead as a result of a confrontation, the military personnel must abstain 
from altering the scene so as to ensure the reality of the events. However, there was a breach of 
that provision as the combatants manipulated the bodies and placed firearms to implicate the 
students in criminal activities and in that way, they were able to justify the executions.  
 
Regarding the investigation, Article 21 of the Constitution enshrines that investigation of crimes is 
under the responsibility of the Public Prosecutor's Office. In this case there was no justification for 
the evidence to have been handed over to military personnel.273 Only a small amount of the cases 
of civilians who die at the hands of members of the Mexican army are investigated in the ordinary 
criminal jurisdiction. This is due in part to the fact that, as a standard practice, agents of the Federal 
Public Ministry and the local Public Ministry refer the cases of deaths in which combatants are 
involved to the military justice system, claiming that they may be the consequence of the arbitrary 
use of force by the members of the armed forces.274 Even if Article 13 of the Constitution prohibits 
the military tribunals to have jurisdiction over civilians, the Mexican army continues to invoke its 
right to investigate and prosecute murders and other serious human rights violations committed by 
the military against civilians, on the basis of Article 57 of the Code of Military Justice.275  
 
Even though in March 2018 six combatants were placed under investigation and three imprisoned 
as a result of the execution, until this day, SEDENA has not recognized its responsibility on the 
deaths of Javier and Jorge and has not compensated the families of the victims. Extrajudicial 
executions in time of peace are considered a crime against humanity if perpetrated as part of a 
generalized attack against the civilian population endorsed by the state.276 Therefore, Mexico as a 
state party to the Rome Statute is failing its obligations to prevent and to punish crimes against 
humanity.  
 
 
                                               
273 See the Constitution of Mexico. 
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Human Rights Watch, p. 192. 
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3.2.3. Arbitrary Detention and Torture 
 
The prohibition of torture as stated in human rights treaties enshrines an absolute right. This implies 
there are not permissible limitations of the prohibition of torture since it is considered as 
peremptory norm (Jus Cogens).277 Despite the fact that torture is prohibited under international law 
and national laws in Mexico, arbitrary detentions occur every day being often the onset for gross 
human rights violations such as torture and other ill-treatment.278 Since decades ago, police forces 
and the armed forces have been carrying out detentions claiming that the suspects are caught in 
flagrante delicto or showing suspicious behavior. This explanation is often given to make obscure 
actions look legitimate, commonly without any further proof. At the same time, detentions 
allegedly in flagrante delicto convey an impression that authorities live up to their responsibilities 
in the fight against crime.279 
 
These forms of detentions are recurrent among members of the armed forces. For example, from 
December 2006 to April 2011 the army detained around 31,000 individuals in operations against 
drug-trafficking.280 A standard practice is often observed in which flagrante detentions are carried 
out without giving an immediate explanation for the reason for the detention or any specific 
information about the legal situation of the detainee. Besides, a long delay is common before the 
individuals are brought before the competent authorities. Also, the authorities frequently do not 
identify themselves at the time of the detention. In practice, the anonymity of the authorities and 
the unjustified delays are oftentimes an excuse to plant evidence, and hence, to evade the 
responsibility to conduct a legitimate investigation into crimes that have been actually committed. 
Detainees are also constrained to provide information or confessions to crimes that often they have 
not committed by means of torture or other ill-treatment. 
 
It needs to be emphasized that all those rights that are repeatedly denied to the detainees are 
protected under international law and the Mexican Constitution, meaning that the authorities are 
obliged to protect the citizens' rights at all times. However, in practice these rights are oftentimes 
                                               
277 Case Posecutor v. Furundžija, Trial Chamber, Judgment, ICTY, 10.12.1998, para. 144. 
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Justice Project Mexico, p.8. Accessible: 
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279 False Suspicions, arbitrary detentions by police in Mexico. Amnesty International, London, 2017, p. 4. 
280 Ni Seguridad, Ni Derechos, Ejecuciones, Desapariciones y Tortura en la “Guerra contra el narcotrafico” de Mexico, 
Human Rights Watch, p. 70. 
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not respected.281 The inability to comply with such major human rights standards demonstrates the 
deficiencies in Mexican democratic system.  
 
Mexico has ratified important conventions against torture, such as the United Nations Convention 
Against Torture (UNCAT)282 and the IACPPT, and in 2017, The General Law to Prevent, 
Investigate and Punish Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(Law against torture)283 entered into force. In spite of that, conventions and national laws cannot 
be deemed as the only factor needed to eradicate torture and other ill-treatment. There is a need for 
solid institutions free of corruption, stronger public policies and programs regarding detention and 
the use of force, as well as to implement deterrent measures to prevent other similar violations. 
Also, political will is crucial to fully implement the laws and enhance accountability framework. 
These elements are vital to prevent further human rights violations. This section will now focus on 
the description and analysis of a case submitted to the CNDH concerning the arbitrary detention 
and torture of Maria Magdalena Saavedra. 
 
On May 10, 2013, in San Luis Potosi, Mexico, Maria Magdalena Saavedra (Magdalena) was at her 
home when around five members of the armed forces from the Secretariat of the Navy (SEMAR) 
broke into her home. The combatants threatened her, hit her in the head, tied her hands and 
blindfolded her.284 Then, they continued to torture her, and while they were beating her, they 
accused her of being the Gulf Cartel accountant. The combatants were demanding information 
about money and other related matters but, clearly, Magdalena did not know what those questions 
were about because her actual profession was as a manicurist in a beauty salon. Since she was not 
giving the information asked, the combatants asphyxiated her by placing a plastic bag on her head 
three times until she fell unconscious. Later, the combatants woke her up with blows while they 
verbally insulted her. Subsequently, they arbitrarily arrested her and forced her into a truck where 
they kept beating her during the whole journey.285  
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282 The United Nations Convention Against Torture. Adopted 04.02.1985. e.i.f. 26.06.1987. 
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At one point they arrived at an illegal detention site where they placed her on a chair, then the 
combatants took off her pants and underwear and proceeded to give her electric shocks in her 
genitals, crotch, stomach, bellybutton and mouth. While the combatants interrogated Magdalena to 
extract information about the money and other related matters, they continued to torture her. 
Eventually, she lost consciousness but when she recovered, the torture continued with electric 
shocks now on her feet and behind her ears.286 
 
As Magdalena could not provide the information wanted, she was flipped against the back of the 
chair and sexually assaulted with an object by inserting it into her anus. Besides the physical and 
sexual torture, the combatants psychologically abused her by telling that they had her daughters’ 
addresses and threatened her to do the same to them and kill her son if she did not cooperate. In 
fear, Magdalena agreed to confess to be part of the organized crime so they would not hurt her 
family.287 In that moment they took her to another room where there was a table full of firearms 
and drugs, one man and one woman who had also been arbitrarily arrested by the SEMAR, and 
coerced Magdalena to confess that she was part of the organized crime and those firearms and 
drugs belonged to her and to the other two persons in the room. 
 
Later, they took the three victims to the Attorney General's Office in Mexico City and Federal 
Public Ministry where Magdalena, in fear, opted to confess and accept all the criminal charges she 
was accused of. While in custody Magdalena expressed that she was bleeding from her vagina and 
anus as a result of the injuries inflicted by the members of the armed forces but the clinician that 
checked her at the Public Ministry stated that “she was okay and did not have any visible 
injuries”.288  
 
On May 20, 2013, the Court in Nayarit, found Magdalena guilty on the following charges: being 
part of the organized crime; stockpiling of weapons; possession of weapons; possession of 
cartridges for weapons for the exclusive use of the army, the navy or the air force; possession of 
cocaine for commercial purposes and use of resources of illegal origin.289  
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During the time of the arrest, SEMAR was working under the framework of operations of the 
Security Team in the ongoing fight against drug-trafficking and other illicit activities.290According 
to SEMAR, Magdalena was arrested because of her alleged suspicious behavior that led to an 
anonymous tip received at the Operation Base of San Luis Potosí. After more than five years in 
prison, on November 9, 2018 Magdalena was released because the judge declared there was not 
enough evidence to convict her.  
 
As a fundamental principle of international law, Jus Cogens establishes specific obligations for the 
states. Those obligations, besides being enshrined in the UNCAT, are also considered being of a 
customary nature meaning all the states must adhere to them. There are two types of obligations 
for the state, the negative obligation not to torture, and the positive obligation to investigate, 
prosecute and punish those responsible for acts of torture or physical, mental or sexual abuse.  
 
Acts of torture or other ill-treatment are persistent and generally common in detentions where the 
security forces try to implicate the individuals with the organized crime, like the case of Magdalena. 
Torture epidemic continues and is systematic in Mexico, therefore, it can be argued that the state 
is failing to keep up with its international obligation to protect its population against this crime. For 
example, there is an alarming number of detainees that were interviewed in the Federal 
Investigation Center alleging to have suffered from torture and ill-treatment since the moment of 
the detention until they were brought before the respective authorities.291 Since the moment of the 
detention, Magdalena suffered physical torture and was sexually and mentally abused. She was 
beaten, asphyxiated, insulted, threatened, and denied of proper medical care. Magdalena’s life was 
seriously endangered because of the inadequate medical care she received. Her medical report did 
not document obvious signs of torture, but instead it minimized the seriousness of her wounds.  
 
In 2003, the PGR became the first institution in the world that started to implement the Istanbul 
Protocol on a daily basis.292 The Istanbul Protocol establishes minimum standards that need to be 
considered throughout the medical and psychological evaluations when seeking to detect whether 
a person has been tortured.293 However, based on the report and the evidence it is possible to say 
that the authorities and the medical personnel were unaware on how to apply the standards set forth 
                                               
290 Ibid., p. 10. 
291 Between 2006-2014 the CNDH received 11,608 complaints of torture and ill-treatment. La Tortura en México: Una 
Mirada desde los Organismos del Sistema de Naciones Unidas, p. 26 para. 24.  
292 R. Loewe. Tortura: Pensamiento y Acción del Colectivo Contra la Tortura y la Impunidad. Colectivo Contra la 
Tortura y la Impunidad, Mexico, 2009, p. 110.  
293 See Istanbul Protocol. e.i.f. 2004. 
 71 
in the Istanbul Protocol during the medical examination of Magdalena. This is an indication that 
the state has to endeavor to improve the qualification of the clinicians who conduct the evaluations 
in order to get an effective documentation of the torture and consequently the acknowledgement of 
the state responsibility for the victims.  
 
On the other hand, the state failed to comply with the positive obligation to investigate, prosecute 
and punish the culprits. Magdalena spent five years in prison for a crime she did not commit 
because the judge and the prosecutors did not carry out a prompt, independent and effective 
investigation. More importantly, investigation and prosecution of those responsible for the 
violations are essential because impunity promotes the recurrence of human rights violations. 
Moreover, the majority of torture cases are not investigated and remain unpunished because 
oftentimes torture is not classified as a crime but as a less serious misconduct. Pursuant to the Law 
against torture, it is considered a crime to use torture or inhumane methods to extract confessions.  
 
Also, in practice there is a so-called exclusionary rule which is regarded as a norm of customary 
international law that envisages an absolute prohibition on the use of statements obtained under 
torture or other ill-treatment in any proceedings.294 The use of tainted evidence in judicial 
proceedings, such as confession extracted under duress, has become a routine, and in practice it is 
very common that the exclusionary rule is not upheld.  As demonstrated in this case, Magdalena’s 
confession was obtained under torture and even if the physical signs corroborated it, the judge 
willingly admitted the confession without questioning if the evidence presented by the prosecutor 
during in the proceedings was in fact obtained by legal means. Consequently, the admission of the 
forced confession constituted a violation of Magdalena’s right of due process and a fair trial.  
 
Since the armed forces were deployed to combat organized crime, their array of competence 
increased in relation to the powers to make arrests, detentions or investigations. This has 
undermined the safeguards against human rights violations and, moreover, promoted abuse and 
impunity. In this particular case no one has been held accountable for the crimes committed against 
Magdalena being another proof of incompatibility of military forces in upholding public security.  
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CONCLUSION  
 
The use of the armed forces in law enforcement in Mexico has led to retreat from fundamental 
democratic principles, such as democratic checks and balances and separation of powers. The 
failure to respect these key principles has seriously harmed the system of protection of human 
rights. Even though Mexico has strengthened the legal framework of the protection of human 
rights, these measures have proven difficult to enforce as the state does not meet the key democratic 
standards. 
 
While the military deployments were initially introduced as temporary by President Calderón, 
thirteen years later the armed forces are still in charge of public security. The presence of 
combatants in the streets for the last decade has not achieved its goal of dismantling and destroying 
the drug cartels and neither has it accomplished the promise to reduce crime and violence. 
Conversely, the strategy has had severe unintended consequences. The deployment of combatants 
has been a key factor in the substantial rise in homicides. Besides, members of the armed forces 
have an alarming track record in human rights abuses. Since the armed forces were mandated to 
carry out public security tasks in the absence of a legal framework and essential safeguards, it 
created a fertile soil for systematic human rights violations on the civilian population that have 
since been committed.  
 
The three cases of human rights violations analyzed in chapter III indicate a systematic failure to 
protect human rights in the realm of public security since members of the armed forces were 
commanded to undertake public security tasks. The cases elucidate various abuses, such as 
enforced disappearances, extrajudicial executions, arbitrary detentions and torture, which 
constitute the main violations perpetrated by the armed forces. These violations are unquestionably 
in breach with fundamental rights guaranteed under constitutional and international law. The right 
to life, the right to humane treatment and the right to personal liberty are imperative among those 
rights. Moreover, other rights, such as the right to a fair trial, right to compensation and the right 
to judicial protection, have also been consistently violated by the state authorities.  
 
The lack of genuine measures of non-repetition against military abuses has contributed to the 
current climate of impunity to a great extent given that the military personnel are hardly ever held 
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accountable for their crimes. The current practice allows the combatants to commit crimes and 
conduct illegal activities with the acquiescence of the state. Based on the cases and the analysis of 
the legal system, it can be concluded that the members of the armed forces are committing grave 
violations against civilians because there is no effective control by civilian authorities over the 
armed forces. Even though the Constitution prohibits the military tribunals to have jurisdiction over 
civilians, the Mexican Army continues to invoke its right to investigate serious human rights 
violations committed by its personnel against civilians on the basis of the Code of Military Justice, 
i.e. military jurisdiction, seriously harming the principle of separation of powers.  
 
As argued in chapter III, classifying the victims as collateral damage or as being part of the 
organized crime has become a common practice by the authorities. This conduct has served as a 
pretext for the authorities to not take responsibility for their actions. Consequently, this behavior 
has made it apparent that the state is failing to keep up with its international obligation to prevent 
and to punish crimes against humanity. 
 
Throughout the years, numerous homicides and human rights violations have been attributed to the 
authorities, to a large extent due to the arbitrary use of force by the armed forces. One of the key 
reasons is that the members of the armed forces are trained to combat the enemy through the use 
of force. It has been long discussed among international organizations, academics and experts that 
the training received by combatants is incompatible with the expected training for someone 
interacting with civilians. The military training is not suitable in civilian law enforcement in most 
cases because it can lead to grave human rights violations. As a consequence, civilian police forces 
must be the ones responsible for the application of laws and public stability.  
 
On top of that, the cases studied in the thesis also demonstrate that the military is one of the least 
transparent and least accountable institutions. Widespread corruption that is deep-rooted in the 
system contributes to opacity. The military information is considered confidential and so the access 
to it is strictly restricted. For increasing the accountability, the state must continue reforming 
several areas, for example, by advancing solid and transparent institutions free of corruption and 
applying stronger public policies. 
 
The cases of human rights violations described in the thesis are not isolated but describe a common 
practice where the authorities do not carry out effective investigations, where the crime scenes are 
manipulated in order to erroneously incriminate the victims as armed assailants or as part of the 
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organized crime or where the victims are arbitrarily arrested without any grounds for their arrest. 
All these failures can be attributable in some part to the illegal practices and malfunctions that 
undermine the criminal justice system.  
 
A major reform in the criminal justice system was undertaken in 2008, as described in chapter II, 
leading to the transition from a mixed inquisitorial criminal justice system to an adversarial 
accusatory system. The accusatory system was set to be fully implemented by 2016 throughout all 
the states of the country. The new criminal justice system offered many positive changes and it 
could be a beacon of hope if implemented well. Reforming the criminal justice system and trying 
to strengthen the judiciary has clearly been a step in the right direction. Yet, the effective 
functioning of the system is improving very slowly. Proper training has not been made available 
for all the agents that work under the new justice system. The law enforcement institutions remain 
weak and ineffective. Also, as proved by the cases, bad practices of the judges, prosecutors and 
defenders continue to hinder the implementation of the new justice system. 
 
The state has allocated more resources for the military in the last decade because the armed forces 
are considered more qualified than the police forces for the fight against organized crime. This 
claim might be correct in the sense that civilian police are not capable of fighting against well-
equipped drug-trafficking organizations. In general, civilian forces are responsible for the 
application of laws and public stability and are not provided with high-caliber weapons. As the 
security situation in Mexico is complex, the armed forces could indeed play a role in assisting the 
police in certain operations against the high-powered criminal organizations. Nonetheless, the 
experience so far has proven that the use of the armed forces lacks necessary safeguards that would 
prevent the violations of human rights. Creating a legal framework that would establish a specific 
and limited role for the armed forces in the realm of public security is critical.  
 
The thesis demonstrates that deficiencies in the democratic system can harm the effective 
protection of human rights. The democratic system in Mexico has been too weak to establish 
essential checks and balances for avoiding human rights abuses. While gradual improvements have 
taken place, many challenges remain. More robust systems of separation of powers, checks and 
balances and a dynamic civil society are prerequisites for becoming a strong democracy. Sufficient 
improvements are unlikely to take place in the years to come which is why the realities of a semi-
democratic system have to be considered when evaluating the options for the use of the armed 
forces in public security tasks. 
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The new administration of Mexico has an urgent need to either integrate the armed forces legally 
in the public security system subjecting them to civilian control or look for viable alternative 
strategies in the fight against crime. So far the creation of a National Guard, an armed force of civil 
nature, has been proposed, as analyzed in chapter II. The President declared that the aim of the 
National Guard is the gradual demilitarization of the country by withdrawing the armed forces that 
are currently undertaking tasks of public security. However, for the National Guard to function, 
several reforms are needed. First and foremost, effective civilian control as well as accountability 
mechanisms must be in place. The new public security plan should not disregard the local police 
forces but instead more resources should be allocated to prepare them for effectively fighting 
against crime. 
 
Given the substantial flaws within the democratic system highlighted above, the study does not 
find support for the hypothesis set up in the thesis. On this account, the use of the armed forces in 
civil law enforcement is incompatible with the system of protection of human rights, even if a legal 
framework would be created. The weaknesses in the current democratic system undermine the 
effectiveness of legal safeguards that could prevent violations of human rights by the members of 
the armed forces. Hence, it is likely that the use of armed forces in police tasks would continue to 
lead to systematic human rights violations. As a result, law enforcement must undergo major 
changes in Mexico in the near future. Mexico is a signatory of numerous human rights treaties and 
has issued several laws concerning the protection of human rights. More importantly, it has 
implemented important constitutional reforms that established the foundation for implementing 
international human rights standards and incorporating them into domestic law in Mexico. The 
reforms have strengthened the framework of rule of law, in conformity with national and 
international law and in line with the separation of powers. In practice however, many loopholes 
have allowed the military and civil authorities, politicians and others to avoid the enforcement of 
the law. The national laws are to a large extent adequate – as discussed in the thesis there are some 
laws that require further reforms – implementation and enforcement, however, lag often way 
behind. 
 
Outlining a detailed roadmap on how to solve the public security crisis in Mexico clearly falls 
beyond the ambit of this thesis. Instead, the thesis demonstrates that prolongation of the unrestricted 
use of the armed forces in public security tasks would lead to the continuation of human rights 
abuses and a further departure from legal obligations of Mexico. When the armed forces are 
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mandated with the principal role in law enforcement in a semi-democratic country, it results in a 
tradeoff between fighting against criminal activity more effectively and harming the structures of 
human rights protection. The war on drugs has not yielded expected outcomes in more than a 
decade, and yet it has engendered long-term harm to the protection of human rights. In these 
circumstances, a relatively fast but orderly departure of the armed forces from primary tasks of law 
enforcement is strongly recommended. This has to be coincided with a sharp increase in resources 
to bolster regular police forces. A timeline of several years for the complete overhaul of the current 
policy is likely to be necessary for avoiding serious disruptions in law enforcement. While the 
general goal of demilitarization of the proposed National Guard is in line with this 
recommendation, there is no indication that any swift changes are planned. The long-term 
implications of such policy on the system of protection of human rights are likely to be even more 
destructive. 
 
Given that the path towards creating a strong democracy in Mexico will unlikely be a short one, 
the armed forces should not be charged with the primary role in the fight against drug cartels, even 
if a strong legal framework would be created. Therefore, the use of the armed forces in law 
enforcement should be strictly limited. The civil forces should be responsible for law enforcement, 
including the fight against drug cartels. Yet, the armed forces could play an auxiliary role, such as 
operational planning, intelligence, or logistics. In case of high-intensity operations against drug 
cartels, the use of the armed forces could also be conceivable because of the lack of capacity within 
civilian police. This involvement, however, should be a decision at the discretion of a civilian 
authority. The basis for such involvement could only be a transparent legal framework. The latter 
combined with an effective system of checks and balances is necessary to avoid overusing the 
resources of the armed forces which may induce unintended consequences, particularly in the form 
of harming the system of human rights protection. 
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ABBREVIATIONS  
 
ACHR   The American Convention on Human Rights  
CNDH   National Human Rights Commission  
IACPPT   The Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture  
ICCPR   The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  
IHL   International Humanitarian Law 
IHRL   International Human Rights Law 
INAI Mexico’s National Institute for Transparency, Access to Information and 
Protection of Personal Data 
INEGI   Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics, Geography, and Information  
ISL   The Internal Security Law 
ITESM  Monterrey Institute of Technology and Higher Education  
Law against torture Law to Prevent, Investigate and Punish Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment  
NIAC Non-International Armed Conflict 
OAS    Organization of American States  
OHCH   The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights  
PAN   National Action Party 
PGR    The Attorney General of the Republic  
PRI    Institutional Revolutionary Party 
SEDENA  The Secretariat of National Defense  
SEMAR  The Secretariat of the Navy  
The Commission The Inter-American Commission on Human Right  
The Inter-American    
Court    The Inter-American Court of Human Rights  
The Manual   The Military’s Manual on the Use of Force  
UN    United Nations  
UNCAT   The United Nations Convention Against Torture  
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ANNEXES  
 
ANNEX 1. Types of accountability295 
  Who 
controls? 
Mechanisms for 
controlling politicians 
Mechanisms for 
controlling bureaucrats 
Horizontal  Executive 
Branch 
- Veto - Policy Setting 
- Regulation 
- Administrative Oversight 
- Nomination and 
Demotion of Personnel 
Legislative 
Branch 
- Impeachment 
- Investigative 
Commissions 
- Veto Override 
- Policy Setting 
- Regulation 
- Administrative Oversight 
- Nomination and 
Demotion of Personnel 
Judicial 
Branch 
- Judicial Review - Judicial Review 
Oversight 
Agencies 
- Enforcement Power 
- Investigative Power 
- Enforcement Power 
- Investigative Power 
Vertical Electoral Political 
Parties 
- Political 
Representation 
- Policy Setting 
- Regulation 
- Policy Setting 
Citizens - Vote  
Societal Civic 
Associations, 
NGOs, Social 
Movements 
- Social Mobilization 
and Public Exposure 
- Investigation by 
Oversight Agencies 
- Agenda Setting 
- Demonstrations 
- Social Mobilization and 
Public Exposure 
- Investigation by 
Oversight Agencies 
- Agenda Setting 
Media - Exposure 
- Litigation 
- Exposure 
- Litigation 
Ombudsmen - Investigation and 
Public Exposure 
- Agenda Setting 
- Investigation and Public 
Exposure 
- Agenda Setting 
 
 
ANNEX 2. Civil Society relations with the state296 
Self-Organization 
Demand Making 
Dependent Autonomous 
Institutionalized Affirmative democracy Mobilized democracy 
Discretionary Prostrate democracy Bifurcated democracy 
Excluded Totalitarianism Authoritarianism 
                                               
295 C. Smulovitz, E. Peruzzotti. Societal Accountability in Latin America. –11(4), Journal of democracy, 2000, p. 153. 
296 Baiocchi, Heller, op. cit., p. 35. 
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